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TO

HIS MOST ESTEEMED

AND

MOST VALUALLE FRIENDS,

DAVID BARKLEY

AND

GEORGE HAY ESQRS.

OF

KÖNIGSBERG,

THIS TREATISE

IS

MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

BY

THE AUTHOR.

A

GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY

VIEW, &c.

THERE is nothing which can accelerate the progreſs of Science more effectually, than a mutual and ſpeedy communication of the various diſcoveries made in different countries.

It is from a ſincere deſire to contribute ſomething, if poſſible, towards promoting this end, that I venture to addreſs the Learned and Philoſophers, on the Kantean principles, concerning Man, the World, and the Deity.

Immanuel Kant, Royal Profeſſor of Morals and Metaphyſics in the Univerſity of Königſberg, now about ſeventy years of age, and ſtill continuing to inſtruct his numerous auditors with diſtinguiſhed applauſe; is univerſally acknowledged by his enemies, as well as friends, to be the greateſt philoſophical genius ever produced in Germany. The works which, after twenty years deep ſtudy and cloſe application, he has publiſhed, between the years 1781 and 1793, and the titles of which are mentioned in the note ſubjoined*, are confidently reported to contain the true ſeeds of a great and beneficial reform in all the departments of theoretical, and in ſome of practical Philoſophy. They are diligently ſtudied by every thinking man in Germany, who would raiſe himſelf above the ſuperficial

* 1. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, or, Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon.—Publiſhed 1781.

2. *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphyſik, die als Wiſſenſchaft wird auftreten können*, or, Introduction to all future Metaphyſics that ſhall deſerve the name of a Science.—Publiſhed 1783.

3. *Metaphyſiſche Anfangsgründe der Naturwiſſenſchaft*, or, Metaphyſical Elements of Natural Philoſophy.—Publiſhed 1787.

4. *Kritik der practiſchen Vernunft*, or, Criticiſm of Practical Reaſon.—Publiſhed 1788.

5. *Kritik*

ſuperficial wiſdom of popular maxims, and penetrate deeper than is uſual into the more important intereſts of an intelligent Being.

Although I cannot, at preſent, undertake to remove the doubts of thoſe writers, who, from want of ſufficient knowledge, have endeavoured to detract from the merits of Profeſſor Kant, ſince this would carry me too far beyond the limits of the preſent Treatiſe—yet I am perſuaded, that the Learned of this country would do great ſervice to the cauſe of truth and ſcience, if, inſtead of leaving any further room for vague and fallacious reports, they were to encourage a correct and ſpeedy tranſlation of his works, and bring the alledged importance of his diſcoveries to a ſevere and impartial examination.

5. *Kritik der Urtheilſkraft*, or, Criticiſm of Judgment.--Publiſhed 1790.

6. *Grundlegung zur Metaphyſik der Sitten*, or, Principles for the Metaphyſics of Morals.--Publiſhed 1792.

7. *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloſzen Vernunft*, or, Religion conſidered within the Bounds of mere Reaſon.---Publiſhed 1793.

8. *Der einzig mögliche Bēweis vom Daſeyn Gottes*, or, The only poſſible Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of the Deity.—Publiſhed 1770.

This work does not conſtitute any part of the Kantean ſyſtem, as it was publiſhed ten years before that ſyſtem was completed.

Whatever the reſult of ſuch endeavours may be, whether they terminate in a clear and complete refutation of the whole celebrated ſyſtem, or juſtify the praiſes hitherto beſtowed on its ſuperior excellence, no one, I truſt, will have reaſon, in either caſe, to complain, with a certain writer, of having loſt his time in a laborious attention, that is unrewarded by the conſciouſneſs of uſeful diſcovery. For Kant treats of objects which intereſt the whole human race; his Philoſophy is a well-regulated whole of principles, not borrowed from preceding ages. Should theſe principles ſtand the teſt of examination, the preſent fund of important knowledge will be conſiderably increaſed, and ſhould they ſhrink before the eye of criticiſm, the detection of their hidden fallacy may ſerve as a remarkable inſtance of the neceſſity of caution againſt errors of a ſimilar nature, and, perhaps, lead to the diſcovery of poſitive and uſeful truths hitherto unknown.

Theſe conſiderations have principally induced me, not only to open a free diſcuſſion of the Kantean principles by lectures, in which I ſhall continue, as I have already done, to anſwer any objections

jections which may be offered, but alſo to ſubmit them, by a ſeries of ſucceſſive publications, to the impartial judgment of a philoſophic public.

The long ſpace of time which I have employed in ſtudying the Kantean Philoſophy, and the favourable opportunity which I have enjoyed, of penetrating into its more difficult arguments, by the immediate aſſiſtance of the author, will, I hope, ſecure me from the reproach of not being ſufficiently prepared for what I intend to execute, as well as from the danger of aſſigning principles to Kant, which he never adopted.

But though, I believe, I am ſufficient maſter of the ſubject itſelf, there will be room for indulgence as to the ſtile and mode in which I may deliver my ſentiments. And this indulgence, I hope, thoſe will not refuſe me, who conſider, that the Engliſh is not my native language—that to diſtinguiſh all the delicacies and all the ſhades of expreſſion, would have required much more time than I could poſſibly command—that the eſſential characteriſtics of a philoſophical ſtile are clearneſs and preciſion, rather than form and dreſs—that all the graces and powers of eloquence have not produced a tranſla-

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tion of Kant's Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon, although this important work might have been tranſlated ten years ago, and that the pleaſures of taſte ought to be reſtrained when they threaten to retard the progreſs of knowledge. However, the ſtricteſt attention to all the remarks which I may be able to obtain concerning my labours, and which, if they are candid and juſt, I ſhall always receive with due acknowledgment, will, I hope, ſoon enable me to ſatisfy the reader in point of language as well as other particulars.

The preſent Treatiſe is chiefly intended to ſuggeſt that preliminary knowledge which is indiſpenſably neceſſary, though not ſufficient to the underſtanding of Profeſſor Kant's principles concerning *Man*, the *World* and the *Deity*, and to enable the reader, as far as is practicable, in an introductory view, previouſly to judge what he may expect from a more comprehenſive ſtudy of the Kantean ſyſtem.

To accompliſh theſe, and ſimilar ends, ſome writers have attempted to preſent the public with mere extracts of what ſeemed to them moſt remarkable in Kant's writings. But his philoſophy

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is not known enough to admit of any intelligible extracts, if not accompanied by conſiderable explanations. It forms one chain of cloſely connected argument, where each link, from the novelty of its conſtruction, muſt neceſſarily perplex the reader, if that immediately preceding be not completely underſtood.

Being fully convinced that this method of introduction muſt *unavoidably* fail of ſucceſs, and that a tranſlation of Kant's works, however deſirable, ought, for many reaſons, not to appear without ſome proper introduction, I ſhall attempt in conſequence of ſome hints contained in Profeſſor Reinhold's excellent Theory of Human Repreſentations, to purſue a different road, and to lay before the reader in this Treatiſe as a preliminary conſideration, firſt, THAT SERIES OF PHILOSOPHIC OPINIONS WHICH HAS GIVEN OCCASION TO THOSE KANTEAN PRINCIPLES, of which I ſhall offer an extract. And this ſeries of opinions will, I think, become an object worthy of particular attention. For although they may already be known from the hiſtory of Philoſophy, yet I am certain, they are not conſidered in that light in which Kant has

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conſidered them, and in which they ought to be conſidered, in order that his improvements and diſcoveries may be properly underſtood and duly eſtimated. To this hiſtorical ſketch of opinions I ſhall add, as a ſecond neceſſary object of previous conſideration, SOME REMARKS ON THAT METHOD OF PHILOSOPHISING WHICH PROFESSOR KANT HAS USED IN HIS ENQUIRIES. And theſe remarks will, I flatter myſelf, contribute to throw a light on the ſpirit of his Philoſophy. I ſhall, beſides, clearly and impartially deſcribe, as far as is practicable, that INFLUENCE WHICH HIS PHILOSOPHY IS LIKELY TO HAVE ON SCIENCE IN GENERAL, AND ON RELIGION AND MORALS IN PARTICULAR. By thus contraſting the Kantean Syſtem with thoſe of other Philoſophers, I think I ſhall enable the reader to form a good previous opinion of what he may reaſonably expect from the ſtudy of Kant's works, and put him in poſſeſſion of ſuch preliminary knowledge as will prove uſeful to him whenever a tranſlation of theſe works ſhall appear.

Conformably to this plan, I ſhall begin with examining that ſeries of philoſophic opinions which has given occaſion to Kant's principles. But that

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theſe opinions may be the more attentively *conſidered*, I ſhall firſt offer a ſhort deſcription of thoſe objects to which they refer.

Theſe opinions do not refer to the objects inveſtigated by Natural Philoſophy, but to thoſe only which the ſtudy of that excellent Science inceſſantly ſtimulates us to examine, and of which it can never of itſelf give any explicit information.

To prevent miſunderſtanding, I muſt ſtate, that by Natural Philoſophy I mean that Science, which enquires into the various properties and relations of the viſible or ſenſible Phenomena in Nature, and which excludes from the compaſs of its contemplations all thoſe things, properties, and relations whoſe exiſtence is not atteſted by the incontrovertible evidence of the ſenſes.

Now, there are many objects of which the ſenſes are totally ignorant, and of which Natural Philoſophy cannot conſequently treat; but which, nevertheleſs, intereſt all mankind, and perpetually obtrude themſelves upon the attention of thoſe who ſurvey the nature of the world with underſtanding.

Theſe remarkable objects, which have their proper place in Metaphyſics only, I ſhall particulariſe

in the following manner; not, however, in order to ſay ſomething unknown, but to pave myſelf a more eaſy paſſage from what is known, to *ſomething* which may perhaps not be known *.

I. Natural Philoſophy, as has been mentioned already, unfolds the various properties diſcoverable in the natural Phenomena by our ſenſes, and by doing this with a rigorous accuracy it prepares us to make a diſtinction between things and the mere properties of things. Thus it aſſerts, that a thing is coloured, ſolid, heavy, figured, &c. and that neither colour, nor ſolidity, nor weight, nor figure, taken ſingly or collectively, can make the thing. But as it informs us only of theſe and other properties, it raiſes our curioſity, to enquire what the things can be which are ſaid to have theſe or other properties. This queſtion, however, remains unanſwered, and although it is extremely metaphyſical, yet it has induced many Philoſophers of great repute to diveſt, in their thoughts, every exiſting

* I beg leave to remark, that if any thing generally known to the ſcholar ſhould have been introduced in ſome other part of this Treatiſe, it has been done with a view to render it uſeful alſo to the beginner in that branch of Philoſophy, of which I ſhall have occaſion to treat.

object in nature, of those properties which we usually discover in them by our senses, and to maintain concerning the remaining invisible or insensible beings several opposite opinions, which it is totally impossible to reconcile. Without approving or disapproving of such a separation, I have only to remark at present, that all the existing things in the world, when thus stript of their sensible properties, are usually called substances, and that substances, in this sense of the word, have been investigated by Professor Kant with the greatest attention, not in order to discover their internal nature, which would have been impossible, but to bring to a final determination those contradictory opinions entertained with regard to them by Philosophers, which, although they may seem trifling at first sight, yet have a decided and fatal influence on the use of our reason in matters of Science, Morals, and Religion.

II. Natural Philosophy not only investigates the properties of the phenomena which surround us, but it also traces them back to their respective causes. It proves with incontrovertible evidence, that all nature consists of one uninterrupted and

complex chain of cauſes and effects, and puts us in mind, that as a chain muſt have a firſt link, ſo the cauſes in nature muſt depend upon a firſt cauſe. This Science goes ſtill farther, and teaches mankind in very plain and convincing language, that the firſt cauſe is an intelligent, mighty, omnipreſent, wiſe, and beneficent Being. But as this very ſame ſcience brings forward equally ſtrong arguments to prove that the properties of the firſt cauſe are different from thoſe of the things produced by it, and this not only in degree, but alſo in kind, philoſophers have been at much variance concerning that ſpecies of properties peculiarly belonging to the firſt cauſe; and as they were taught by the ſame ſcience to diſtinguiſh between things and mere properties of things, they attempted, in conſequence of this, to free their idea of the firſt cauſe from all thoſe appendages, as they expreſs themſelves, borrowed from the perceivable nature of man or the world; but finding this idea to vaniſh in the ſame proportion as they deprived it of thoſe borrowed properties, they began to diſagree concerning what they ought preciſely to think by the term *firſt cauſe*, and much

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more concerning what demonſtrations they ſhould offer in ſupport of its exiſtence.

In order to ſettle this diviſion of ſentiment, which originally ſprung up from an accurate ſtudy of Natural Philoſophy, and which muſt inevitably prove highly injurious to the cauſe of truth and virtue, Profeſſor Kant has compoſed a ſection in his Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon, which in the opinion of the acuteſt German Philoſophers, cannot fail of deciding thoſe diſſentions completely and for ever.

III. Natural Philoſophy not only inveſtigates the properties and cauſes of things, but it alſo claſſes the whole viſible world into various kingdoms and diſtricts of living and inanimate objects, penetrates through that multiplicity of connections, in which they ſtand with men as well as themſelves, and informs us that all the innumerable objects in the univerſe are but parts of a grand and beautiful whole. But after it has thus excited the natural curioſity of man to aſk whether this whole is bounded or infinite, it does not return any ſatisfactory anſwer to this queſtion.

The bounds of the univerſe in time and ſpace, together with the limits preſcribed to the diviſibility

lity of matter, are unqueſtionably objects not perceivable by the ſenſes; it is, therefore, no wonder that Natural Philoſophy excludes them from the circle of its enquiries. It might indeed ſeem that mankind would loſe nothing by being ignorant of the bounds of the univerſe. But ſuch ignorance neceſſarily implies a want of other knowledge highly unfavourable to the true intereſts of mankind. For Profeſſor Kant, who treats of this ſubject at large in his Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon, has clearly demonſtrated that doubts and diſſentions concerning the bounds of the univerſe are a ſure ſign that the bounds of human knowledge are not completely fixed. But wherever the limits of human knowledge are not fully aſcertained, there will be no certain means to ſtop the progreſs of enthuſiaſm, ſuperſtition, and ſcepticiſm, than which there can be no greater enemies to the true intereſts of mankind.

IV. Man, as a part of the viſible world, falls likewiſe under the conſideration of Natural Philoſophy. This remarkable phenomenon has been the object of examination for many thouſand years, and has, among many other wonderful properties,

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diſcovered a faculty of perceiving things by means of organical ſenſes. The enquirers into nature obſerved indeed, very early, that the perceiving faculty, or rather the percipient in man, cannot be known by means of the natural eye, touch, &c. and that therefore, it cannot have the properties of extenſion, ſolidity, &c. which are conſtantly attached to the objects of the eye and touch; for otherwiſe it would, in their opinion, be viſible or tangible, which it is not. But although Natural Philoſophy moſt irreſiſtibly leads us to make this remarkable diſtinction between the percipient and the objects of the external ſenſes, yet it leaves us unſatisfied, when we aſk, wherein that diſtinction preciſely conſiſts, whether the one be ſimple and the others compoſed, the firſt a ſpirit and the laſt corporeal; or whether all the exiſtences in the univerſe, according to their true nature, are merely material or merely ſpiritual, or both at the ſame time.

It has been attempted to draw the attention of man from SUCH ABSTRUSE SPECULATIONS, as they are called, into the fertile field of Practical Philoſophy; but theſe attempts have always miſcarried. And indeed, what can be more natural than that

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man, who feels a curioſity to know the nature of the ſurrounding objects, ſhould take an equal intereſt in knowing his own perceiving ſelf.

V. Natural Philoſophy aſſerts, that from the ſame cauſes under ſimilar circumſtances, the ſame effects may be expected. It proves with great force of argument, that this rule holds good within the whole circle of corporeal phenomena; that is to ſay, as far as they are known. But when we conſider man, and endeavour to account for the various motions and actions obſervable in him, we believe this rule muſt be liable to ſome exception. For every man's own experience will evince, that from the ſame cauſes and under ſimilar circumſtances, the ſame effects are not always produced upon human volitions; that fire and ſword, for inſtance, may, at one time, be the cauſe of flight and ſubmiſſion, and at another, of the ſtrongeſt reſolution to reſiſt, even at the hazard of life itſelf. This ſeems to demonſtrate the exiſtence of a certain power in man, which may act uninfluenced by other powers, and obey no other laws than thoſe of its own conſtitution. But whether man has really a power of this deſcription

ſcription or not, Natural Philoſophy, although it directs our attention to this ſubject very frequently, has not been able to decide, that is, not in an univerſally evident manner. For the Neceſſitarians who, as is generally known, make a conſiderable party in the philoſophic world, publicly proteſt againſt the arguments that have been brought forward in favour of ſuch a power, and boldly affirm that they are not concluſive.

Without declaring myſelf for or againſt any of theſe parties, it is ſufficient at preſent, to notice that the human will, be it free or not, is an object imperceptible by the ſenſes, and therefore inacceſſible to the inveſtigations of Natural Philoſophy, provided we keep to that definition which was given of this Science by the great Bacon.

Profeſſor Kant has devoted a moſt remarkable chapter in his Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon, to the ſubject of Human Volition, where he propoſes a method of ſettling the diſſentions regarding this difficult queſtion, which is equally new and deſerving of attention.

I have now clearly pointed out all the objects of thoſe philoſophic opinions which rouſed the

genius of Kant to build his celebrated ſyſtem concerning Man, the World, and the Deity. Theſe objects were the nature of the ſubſtances of which the world is compoſed, the bounds of the univerſe, the firſt cauſe of all that exiſts, the nature of the percipient principle, or the ſoul in man, and the free agency of human volition. Of theſe objects I have remarked that they are imperceptible by the ſenſes, and that as ſuch, they cannot belong to the field of Natural Philoſophy. As Metaphyſics form that Science which treats of exiſtences not perceivable by the ſenſes, thoſe objects will moſt naturally have their places in this ſcience; and as every man from the higheſt to the loweſt in capacity, has formed for himſelf ſome notions of the firſt cauſe, the ſoul, the human will, &c. it follows, that every man is, in ſome degree, a Metaphyſician, although it cannot be inferred from this circumſtance, that every man's metaphyſics will agree with thoſe of others, or be equally correct.

It is now proper to lay before the reader that variety of philoſophical opinions which predominate at this day, concerning the objects I have particulariſed,

ticulariſed, and this I ſhall endeavour to do briefly in the following manner:

OPINIONS.

I. CONCERNING THE SUBSTANCES OF THE WORLD.

(*a*) All exiſting ſubſtances are either ſimple, or compoſed of the ſimple.

(*b*) There is no where in the univerſe any ſubſtance exiſting which is ſimple or compoſed of ſimple parts, but all that really exiſts is compoſed in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word.

II. CONCERNING THE BOUNDS OF THE UNIVERSE IN TIME AND SPACE.

(*a*) The world has a beginning in time, and bounds in ſpace.

(*b*) The world has neither a beginning in time, nor bounds in ſpace.

III. CONCERNING THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THAT EXISTS.

(a) There is an abſolutely neceſſary Being belonging to the world, either as a part or as a cauſe.

(b) There is no abſolutely neceſſary Being exiſting, either within or without the world.

IV. CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE PERCIPIENT, OR THE SOUL IN MAN.

(a) The ſoul or the percipient is compoſed, and is material.

(b) The ſoul or the percipient is not compoſed, is not matter, but it is ſimple and ſpiritual.

V. CONCERNING THE FREEDOM OF HUMAN VOLITIONS.

(a) The phenomena in nature cannot be all accounted for from the operations of mechanical

chanical cauſes, and it is indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſuppoſe a kind of cauſes operating freely and independently of foreign impulſe.

(b) There is no freedom of operation in any of the cauſes found in the univerſe, but all events happen according to a determined and invariable neceſſity.

Here we have five plain queſtions, viz. "Are the ſubſtances ſimple or not?" "Has the world a beginning in time or not?" "Has it bounds in ſpace or not?" "Is an abſolutely neceſſary firſt cauſe exiſting or not?" "Is the human will free or not?" Concerning each of theſe queſtions we have found two oppoſite opinions. Theſe oppoſite opinions have been defended by philoſophers of the firſt rank for more than ſeventeen hundred years; but none of them has become univerſally evident, nor has any one of them been completely refuted.

The learned and philoſophical reader will require no proof of what I have juſt aſſerted. He already knows, from the writings yearly publiſhed and republiſhed on the ſubjects of the human will, the nature of the ſoul, the ſubſtances of the world, and the bounds of the univerſe, that the public opinion really is divided on theſe ſubjects, as I have deſcribed it to be.

As to the oppoſite opinions regarding the firſt cauſe, it may be imagined that they ſuppoſe the exiſtence of Atheiſts. But this they are not intended to ſuppoſe; I think too favourably of the underſtandings of men, to be eaſily perſuaded, that any intelligent being can, with an attentive eye, contemplate the wonderful ſtructure of the immenſe univerſe, and yet ſeriouſly believe in his heart there is no God. Thoſe oppoſite opinions do not originate in Atheiſm, but in an inconſiderate, though well meant zeal to demonſtrate the exiſtence of the Deity; which zeal diſcovers itſelf even in the language of thoſe who proteſt againſt all demonſtration in this particular. The exiſtence of the Deity, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is not demonſtrable. And as every attempt to demonſtrate what is not demonſtrable,

monſtrable, muſt neceſſarily firſt excite doubts, and then oppoſite opinions and demonſtrations, ſo the repeated attempts to demonſtrate the exiſtence of the Deity have really introduced into the world many doubts, oppoſite opinions, and demonſtrations, concerning this important object, which, although they cannot ſucceed in reducing ſound ſenſe to complete Atheiſm, for this would be impoſſible, may ſerve, however, to force the Dogmatiſts to correct their demonſtrations, and to reject thoſe means which are calculated to defeat their own purpoſes.

Suppoſing it therefore as a fact known to every Scholar and Philoſopher, that ſuch difference of opinion, as above ſtated, does yet really prevail, and truſting the reader will agree with me, that a conſtant repugnance in ſentiment reſpecting objects of great importance to mankind, muſt neceſſarily have a tendency, if not to erect the black ſtandard of Atheiſm, yet to enlarge the empire of Scepticiſm, and to generate a kind of diſtruſt in the deciſions of reaſon, I ſhall proceed to exhibit thoſe meaſures which Profeſſor Kant thought proper to adopt in order to remove that evil.

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This Philoſopher ſoon obſerved, that the methods which till then had been uſed to ſettle thoſe diſſentions were the very cauſes of their having continued through ſo many centuries, and of their preſent continuance. For it had either been cuſtomary to ridicule every man who engaged in controverſies of this nature, and to brand his doubts with the name of metaphyſical ſubtleties, or to defend one ſide of the queſtion and demonſtrate the falſehood of the oppoſite ſide. But it had not been perceived that neither of theſe methods were adapted to the end propoſed. For, in the firſt place, every man is born a Metaphyſician. He cannot help reaſoning in ſome ſerious moments on the nature of his own perceiving ſelf, the nature of the things around him, and that Being which has called him and the world into exiſtence. Now, in the prevailing fluctuation of oppoſite opinions upon theſe ſubjects, if any man ſhould happen to involve himſelf in doubts, by endeavouring to ſtop the current of ambiguity, ſurely this evil can be remedied only by the ſuperior force of argument, not by wit or ridicule, and much leſs by indecent contempt. In the ſecond

place,

place, I aſk if it has ever been clear, that either of the two contending parties muſt be right and the oppoſite wrong? Can it not happen that both parties may be totally wrong in ſome reſpects, and perfectly right in others, and that, therefore, the one of them obſerving the weak ſides of their opponents, cannot for that reaſon, come over to their opinion, although the falſehood that lies concealed in their own arguments, and is well obſerved by the contrary party, cannot reaſonably prevail upon that contrary party to exchange their opinions for oppoſite ones equally erroneous? Now, if this ſhould be the caſe with the controverſies concerning the materiality and immateriality of the ſoul, the freedom of human volition, &c. it is evident that the method of deciding them by defending one ſide of the queſtion, and refuting its oppoſite, although proper in many caſes, muſt be highly improper in the preſent.

Profeſſor Kant not only ſuſpected that this might be the caſe with regard to the controverſies alluded to, and the methods of deciding them, but really diſcovered that his ſuſpicion was but too well founded, and that the contending parties,

inſtead of contriving arguments for and againſt the materiality or immateriality of the ſoul, the neceſſity or freedom of human volition, &c. ought to have laid aſide all argumentation until they had agreed about truths of a very different nature. For in examining the preciſe ſtate of this controverſy, he was ſurpriſed to find the conceptions formed of the ſoul, the human will, the ſubſtances, &c. were ſuch as not only to admit of two oppoſite opinions, but alſo, what might ſeem incredible, to furniſh arguments in favour of both, which are equally ſtrong and convincing. This remarkable circumſtance left no longer any doubt upon his mind, but that in thoſe notions, although they are far from being merely fictitious, *yet* ſome contradictory ingredients muſt lie at the bottom, which are unobſerved by the contending parties, and which, when drawn to light, would lay open the miſtake, and blend their claſhing conceptions in one ſolid maſs of genuine truth.

Thoſe Sections of the Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon, wherein this extraordinary *conflict of thought* has been purſued to its minuteſt elements, belong to the moſt inſtructive parts of that work. They are highly

highly beneficial to mankind, and will doubtleſs give a laſting peace to the regions of Speculative Philoſophy. As the preſent Treatiſe is merely introductory, it performs its duty, when it marks the places of inveſtigation, points out the method, and refers the reader to thoſe works, where further information may be obtained.

Accordingly, without attempting to demonſtrate any of Profeſſor Kant's opinions, it is ſufficient for me to prove, by *an inſtance*, the poſſibility of forming ſuch conceptions of things, as ſhall not only occaſion two contradictory opinions, but alſo ſuggeſt arguments for them, that *ſhall* be equally ſtrong and convincing. Let the reader figure to his mind a ſquare circle, and he will have an object before him, concerning which he may demonſtrate with equal force of argument two contradictory aſſertions, viz. that a ſquare circle is, at the ſame time, round and not round. But this repugnance could never occur, if the ſubject of theſe aſſertions, or the conception of a ſquare circle, did not involve repugnant parts. The ſame caſe holds good, according to the reſults of the Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon, with regard to the conceptions of ſubſtances,

the Soul, the freedom of human Volition, the Deity, and the *contradictory demonſtrations* built upon them. They contain, like the conceptions and the opinions of a ſquare circle, ſome indubitable truth found by analyſis, but include, at the ſame time, ſome mixture of contradiction.

Profeſſor Kant, not ſatisfied with having made this diſcovery, moſt earneſtly endeavoured then to find wherein the contradiction concealed in thoſe remarkable conceptions conſiſted, and how it could be laid open in the moſt unequivocal manner. He was well aware, that an analyſis would indeed ſhew their component parts; but the queſtion being what they ought to contain, and not what they do, he ſoon perceived, that beſides the analytical, another method muſt neceſſarily be purſued. He ſaw, that, to correct our notions of things, we muſt not only reſolve them into their elementary parts, but alſo compare them with thoſe objects which they repreſent. But here a difficulty aroſe, which ſeemed inſurmountable. For thoſe objects to which the conceptions in queſtion refer, are, the Soul, the Will of Man, the Deity, &c. which, as has been ſhewn, are altogether imperceptible to the ſenſes.

ſenſes. How then ſhould we compare our conceptions with things that are imperceptible?—The queſtion, in the preſent caſe, naturally is, "Can any man have notions of real exiſtencies which are imperceptible?" Before we have ſatisfactorily anſwered this queſtion, all philoſophiſing on theſe imperceptible objects muſt neceſſarily be extremely unſafe. Profeſſor Kant, obſerving that mankind is more concerned to acquire knowledge, than mere conceptions of things, changed the above queſtion in the following manner: "Is it poſſible for the human intellect to know any thing of imperceptible objects;" and to expreſs this in a manner ſtill more comprehenſive, he propoſed to himſelf the following problem:

"*What* can be known by man in general, or "what is the nature and extent of human "knowledge in general?"

To this queſtion he found, indeed, a great many direct and indirect anſwers given in the various eſſays publiſhed on the human mind, but not one among them which was completely ſatisfactory. For in ſpite of all the elegance, in point of method and diction, diſplayed on this ſubject, it appears that

that nothing deciſive has been brought out. For one part of the philoſophic world profeſſes to know only material objects, another not only material but alſo ſpiritual objects, and a third pretends to know nothing at all, that is to ſay, with indubitable certainty.

Profeſſor Kant, deſirous to eſtabliſh, as already mentioned, a criterion of what is knowable in general, ſoon perceived that it would be vain to look for it in the variety of corporeal and ſpiritual objects, pretended to be already known; for this might, perhaps, give us a criterion of what has been known, but not, as is here requiſite, of what is knowable in general. He, therefore, concluded, that the materials for ſuch a criterion muſt lie within, and not without, man, that they muſt reſide in a certain capacity, which enables him to know things.

Being convinced that reaſon muſt either in part or wholly conſtitute the capacity of knowledge, he thought it indiſpenſably neceſſary to enquire into the nature of this faculty.

And this enquiry ſeemed neceſſary from more than one conſideration. For there is perhaps no age, in which reaſon has been more adored, or

more

more condemned, than the preſent. By ſome it is exalted as the Awful Judge, before whoſe tribunal alone the moſt weighty concerns of mankind can and ought to be decided; by others it is repreſented as a being of contracted views, and which, without the aſſiſtance of Divine illumination, would blindly hurry man into everlaſting perdition.

But what then is the peculiar nature of this mighty or feeble faculty? To this we find the following anſwers:—It is a faculty which every body knows, without explanation; it may be better felt than explained, and definitions may here perplex, but they cannot inſtruct. It is a faculty which diſtinguiſhes man from the brutes. It is that in man, which enables him to form deſigns, and to diſcover the moſt proper means. It is a power, which elevates the views of man beyond the confines of this globe, conducts him from one ſyſtem of worlds to another, and leads him to the firſt of all beings. It is a power which, by the aſſiſtance of organization, enables man to comprehend what paſſes within and without him.

All theſe various opinions comprehended in one notion, form the moſt extenſive, and therefore the

moſt

moſt indefinite ſenſe, in which the term, reaſon, has hitherto been uſed. There is, however, a meaning in this term, which is a little more confined, and, according to which, it implies thoſe mental faculties that are oppoſed to ſenſe, and which diſcover themſelves in judgments and reaſonings. The term reaſon, taken in a more confined ſenſe, will therefore comprehend, beſides what is properly called reaſon, alſo the judging faculty or the underſtanding, and exclude the faculty of ſenſe. The term reaſon, conſidered in the moſt confined and definite ſenſe it has ever been received, not only excludes the faculty of ſenſe, but alſo that of judgment or underſtanding, and implies merely the faculty of reaſoning or concluding, diſtinctly conſidered from all other faculties of the mind.

When, therefore, reaſon forms deſigns, or diſcovers means, when it traces the ſyſtems of immenſe worlds, where the eye ſees only ſmall luminous ſpots, when it penetrates into the ſecrets of inviſible regions, and climbs up to the firſt of all beings, it muſt do this by means of concluſions.—This aſſertion muſt be granted, provided reaſon ſhall remain an active faculty. For, according to all logical diſquiſitions, there are only three different

kinds

kinds of operations, by which the mind knows things, viz. ſimple apprehenſion, judgment, and concluſion. As the firſt can belong to ſenſe only, the ſecond to the underſtanding only, there remains no other than the laſt, or the concluſion for reaſon; and, therefore, whatever this faculty may know, it muſt neceſſarily acquire that knowledge by the act of concluding.

In order to fix the bounds of what can be known in general, Profeſſor Kant thought it indiſpenſably requiſite to enquire, what may be known by this faculty of concluding.

The works hitherto written on the various powers of the mind ſeemed to promiſe no inconſiderable aſſiſtance in this attempt, and, indeed, the unanimity with which they had defined what we are to underſtand by a concluſion, induced Kant to believe, that they would be as unanimous in defining what we are to underſtand by reaſon. For, according to what has been already ſaid, when the faculty of concluding is rightly and univerſally underſtood, the faculty of reaſoning cannot be any longer miſconceived, and when the nature of reaſon is known, the bounds of human knowledge at-

tainable by reaſon cannot of courſe be miſtaken. But in theſe expectations he found himſelf very much diſappointed.

A concluſion is indeed defined to be the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas, by comparing them to a third ; but grant this definition to be correct, and it will follow, that reaſon, ſo far from knowing any thing, can of itſelf know nothing. For how can a mere concluding faculty, as it has been juſt deſcribed, give knowledge, when it ſuppoſes ideas, of which knowledge is compoſed, as neceſſary to the exerciſe of its functions.

If then the concluding act of reaſon cannot make us know any thing, but by means of ideas, the queſtion ariſes: Whence reaſon acquires the ideas of which it forms its concluſions?—When theſe ideas refer to objects which ſtrike the ſenſes, the anſwer will be eaſy, and we may ſay: From experience; but when they refer to objects not perceivable by the ſenſes, ſuch as the ſoul, the firſt cauſe, &c. whence does reaſon derive theſe ideas?

From

From revelation, ſay ſome philoſophers, eſpecially thoſe who think human reaſon too weak to acquire true and ſufficient knowledge of ſuch objects by its own natural powers. Theſe good men, ſay other philoſophers, prove the weakneſs of human reaſon by their example, rather than by their argument. In ſupport of this aſſertion, they argue, that every revelation of the Deity, the ſoul, or other objects beyond the reach of the ſenſes, which ſtands up in oppoſition to ſound reaſon, ought to be rejected as ſpurious. If this be rational, it follows, ſay they, that ideas of the ſoul, the Deity, &c. muſt be prior in the mind, and not poſterior to revelation. For who, continue theſe men, can reaſonably adopt or reject any ideas offered of thoſe important objects, without having examined them, and how can they be examined, without being compared with ideas already in the mind; and who, therefore, can pretend to have received juſt and correct ideas of the Deity, the ſoul, &c. from revelation, when the correctneſs and juſtneſs of the ideas that are contained in any revelation, can only be aſcertained and acknowledged by comparing them to ideas which muſt

exiſt previouſly in the mind, in order to render ſuch compariſon and examination poſſible.

Although the philoſophers who are of the laſt-mentioned opinion, perſuade themſelves that they have approached much nearer to truth, in not deriving the ideas of inſenſible objects from revelation; yet they widely differ as to the ſource from which they are derivable, and reciprocally refute one another in the following manner:

As theſe ideas, ſay they, cannot originally derive from revelation, they muſt be produced, or acquired by reaſon in a more natural manner. But as reaſon is merely a faculty of concluding, it can as ſuch produce no ideas at all; it muſt, therefore receive them. Now there are only two poſſible ways of receiving them; either the mind receives them at its creation, and then they are innate, or it receives them from the knowledge of external objects, wherein they lie concealed, and from which they are brought into light by abſtraction or derivation. In the laſt caſe, they are not innate, but acquired.

Thoſe philoſophers who aſſume innate ideas, are expoſed to the following objections: He that aſſumes

innate

innate ideas, muſt allow a diſtinction between theſe ideas and the objects to which they refer; otherwiſe he confounds ideas with things, and things with ideas. He muſt further allow the neceſſity of proving, that thoſe ideas which he calls innate do really refer to exiſtencies diſtinct from them; for, otherwiſe, he cannot be certain, that they are altogether any thing more than mere ideas or entities of the mind. But how can he prove this? To ſay, I have ideas of this or that deſcription, and therefore theſe ideas muſt refer to real exiſtencies, is proving nothing. And what other argument remains? Compariſon is impracticable; for the objects to be compared lie beyond the limits of the ſenſes. If, therefore, it is not yet decided whether the ſuppoſed innate ideas are *real* ideas or not, it cannot be certain that they are innate.

And indeed a very reſpectable body of Philoſophers have been convinced by theſe and other reaſons, that the hypotheſis of Plato and Leibnitz concerning innate ideas is not tenable. They have accordingly reſolved to try a different method of enquiry, and to derive, with Ariſtotle and Locke, the ideas of immaterial objects from expe-

rience.

rience. The principle upon which they proceed, is, that every idea of immaterial as well as material objects has originally entered the mind through the channel of the ſenſes, except the ideas referring to the operations of the mental faculties, which are acquired by the act of reflection. Reaſon, in their opinion, muſt accordingly have a power to unfold the immaterial, which exiſts without the mind, from the material, which works upon the ſenſes. The mode in which reaſon performs this unfolding operation, they expreſs by the terms Abſtraction, Modification, Derivation. The only misfortune is, that theſe Philoſophers do not, and cannot, agree, at this day, to which of theſe three modes of unfolding they ſhould give the preference. And, indeed, they will never agree concerning this circumſtance. For what material object can be modified into a Deity? Can the Deity or the ſoul form any perceivable parts of any body, and ſo admit of being abſtracted or derived from it? Nevertheleſs they believe, that as our ideas of immaterial objects cannot be furniſhed by revelation, nor conſidered as innate, they muſt, therefore, be acquired by ſome mode of abſtraction

ſtraction or other, although it is not yet agreed as to the way in which this is practicable.

Other Philoſophers finding three oppoſite opinions, concerning one queſtion which have been alternately deſtroyed and revived again for many centuries, are inclined equally to doubt of them all, and either believe that nothing deciſive can ever brought out on theſe points in debate, or that theſe diſſentions may, or will in time, be brought to a final determination.

Of the laſt opinion was Profeſſor Kant. He indeed doubted of the correctneſs of thoſe opinions entertained by the adherents of Leibnitz and Locke, and clearly ſaw, that as long as it is not decided, whence reaſon derives the ideas of immaterial objects neceſſary to its bold concluſions on immaterial exiſtencies, ſo long it muſt be abſolutely uncertain what we are preciſely to underſtand by reaſon, and much more ſo, what kind of knowledge we may ſafely expect from this faculty; but being once determined to diſcover, if poſſible, ſome mode of demonſtrating the bounds of human knowledge, or human ignorance, and believing that the underſtanding might perhaps contain

ſome

ſome data from which reaſon might derive the ideas of immaterial objects, he attempted to inveſtigate the nature of this faculty.

The firſt queſtion to be anſwered in order to enſure ſucceſs, naturally was: What is meant by the term Underſtanding? To this he found the following and ſimilar anſwers: It is a faculty merely ariſing from ſpeech. It is a judging faculty. What is judgment? It is an operation of the mind ſo familiar to every man who has underſtanding, and its name is ſo common and ſo well underſtood, that it needs no definition. The moſt exact account which Profeſſor Kant could obtain of the underſtanding, was, that this faculty enables a man to perceive the agreement and diſagreement of two ideas immediately, in diſtinction from reaſon which makes him perceive the ſame agreement and diſagreement of ideas, only mediately, that is to ſay, by means of comparing them to a third.

According to this account of things, it was clear at once, that the underſtanding being a faculty of perceiving only the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, or, what is the ſame, of perceiving their common nature and ſpecific differences muſt as ſuch

neceſſarily

neceſſarily ſuppoſe ideas itſelf, and receive them from ſome other quarter, before it can exerciſe its functions upon them. And here a queſtion ariſes ſimilar to that reſpecting reaſon: Whence does the underſtanding receive the ideas referring to immaterial objects?

If the mind is active with regard to the acquiſition of knowledge; if knowledge involves ideas of real exiſtencies; if, farther, the activity of the mind muſt neceſſarily conſiſt in concluding, judging, and apprehending ſimply, it neceſſarily follows, that, as the ideas of immaterial objects cannot be derived from any concluding or judging operation, they muſt either originate in ſimple apprehenſion, or in the dreaming faculty of the imagination. In the laſt caſe, it would be eaſy to fix the bounds of human knowledge, becauſe it would be manifeſt, that man can have knowledge of material objects only.

Profeſſor Kant, accordingly, inveſtigated the nature of ſimple apprehenſion. He found, that to apprehend things ſimply, means, in the preſent caſe, as much as to contemplate them immediately, and without the aid of deduction. He farther ob-

 ſerved,

ſerved, that to contemplate things immediately, requires man to have a ſenſitive faculty; becauſe without ſuch a faculty, man could not have objects for his contemplation, any more than he could have objects for ſight, without a faculty of ſeeing. This, however, is pretty generally granted, and it would be well, if Philoſophers did as generally agree concerning what we are preciſely to underſtand by the faculty of ſenſe.

Profeſſor Kant finding, that among the eſſential conditions, under which ſimple apprehenſion is poſſible, the ſenſitive faculty muſt be numbered, and that, in conſequence, whatever contradicts the nature of ſenſe, cannot be contemplated by any effort of ſimple apprehenſion, believed it to be indiſpenſably requiſite to penetrate deeply into the conſtitution of the ſenſitive faculty, and to collect all poſſible information on this ſubject.

He took it for granted, that nothing was ſo well known, and ſo generally underſtood, as the ſenſitive faculty; becauſe he found almoſt every Philoſopher ſuppoſed it to be known, and conſidered it as deſerving only a ſuperficial explication, and as requiring the mere mention of its name to make it directly

directly underſtood; but when he came to contraſt their reſpective opinions on this ſubject more accurately, he was ſurpriſed to find, that within the whole compaſs of Speculative Philoſophy, there was not one object leſs known and leſs underſtood than the nature of the ſenſitive faculty *.

I. The Materialiſts have laid it down as the fundamental principle of their Philoſophic Syſtem, that all exiſtencies in the world are either mere bodies, or properties of bodies, or relations between bodies. Agreeably to this principle, they explain the ſenſitive faculty to be a mere property of organization, and to conſiſt chiefly in the irritability of the nerves. As in this manner corporeal objects only can be known to man, ſenſe with them is the ſource of all true and ſubſtantial knowledge. And as reaſon and the underſtanding can have no other employment left than that of comparing and arranging the materials furniſhed by ſenſe, theſe fa-

* As I am now proceeding to contraſt more particularly the opinions of the philoſophical parties into which the public is divided, I muſt obſerve, that theſe parties have done much good to the cauſe of truth, and that their diviſion in ſentiment cannot reflect any diſcredit upon their underſtandings; for this diviſion originates in certain deluſions of reaſon, that are as natural and unavoidable as thoſe of the eye with regard to the motion of the ſun, and the colour of bodies.

culties are alſo mere modifications of the organization.

It is chiefly upon the foundation of Materialiſm, as here delineated, that it has been attempted by many celebrated Philoſophers to conſider thought as a mere property of the nervous ſyſtem, to take the capacity of reciprocal reſiſtance in inert, ſolid, and incompreſſible bodies, for a mechanical ſpecies of perception, to account for all our ſenſations, ideas, and mental operations, from vibrations, vibratiuncles, or miniature vibrations of the medullary ſubſtance of the nerves and brain, to go even ſo far as to ſuppoſe our ideas of ſight to conſiſt of a kind of matter reſembling the Bononian ſtone, or ſome kind of phoſphorus, of which the mind could fabricate ſome hundreds in a day, &c. and to believe that ſcience will then alone advance with rapid ſtrides, when future generations ſhall put all kinds of evidences and enquiries into mathematical forms, and, as it were, reduce Ariſtotle's ten categories, and Biſhop Wilkins's forty ſumma genera to the head of quantity alone, ſo as to make Mathematics and Logic, Natural Hiſtory and Civil Hiſtory,

and

and Philoſophy of all other kinds, coincide omni ex parte.

II. The Idealiſts entertain opinions diametrically oppoſite to thoſe adopted by the Materialiſts. They aſſert, that there is no world exiſting without the mind, and that therefore there is no occaſion for aſſuming any kind of ſenſitive faculty to inform us of bodies, nerves, miniature vibrations, phoſphorus and Bononian ſtones, all theſe things exiſting no where elſe than in our own imagination, where they are fabricated and converted into objects that ſhall have an external exiſtence.

In our enlightened times it would be ridiculous to avow opinions of this deſcription. It ſeems even incredible, that any Idealiſt in any age could forget himſelf ſo far as to run *his head againſt a poſt*, merely becauſe he found in his ſyſtem, that no external world does exiſt, and that therefore nothing could be without to hurt him. Yet, nevertheleſs, I am bold enough to affirm, without being an advocate for Idealiſm, that this ſect, when argument, and not cuſtom or habit, ſhall decide, muſt neceſſarily gain additional ſtrength, in the ſame proportion as Materialiſm attains higher degrees of perfection,

ſection, and that it may therefore ſerve as a powerful mean, if not to refute the arguments of this ſect, at leaſt to make them extremely ſuſpicious; as may be ſeen from the following reaſonings:

The Materialiſts conclude, from their ideas of an external world, that therefore ſuch a world muſt exiſt; but from the exiſtence of an idea to the exiſtence of its object, there is no manner of concluſion. They farther maintain, that the exiſtence of an external world is certain to demonſtration, becauſe we have intuitive knowledge of it, and becauſe intuitive knowledge wants no demonſtration, it being ſelf-evident. But this intuitive knowledge, ſay the Idealiſts, reports of the external things that they are coloured, which they evidently are not—that they are ſolid, which they are not, ſolidity implying a ſet of ſenſations exiſting within our touch, and not without it—that they are extended and figured, which they are not, the notions of extenſion and figure being merely relative, that is, no notions of the things at all. Now, continue they, ſolidity, figure, and colour, are conſidered by the Materialiſts as neceſſary to the very exiſtence of external things, ſo that when

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theſe properties, eſpecially extenſion, are taken away, the things immediately vaniſh. But it has been juſt mentioned, that theſe properties can exiſt no where elſe than in the ideas of the mind; hence it follows, that the thing, whoſe very exiſtence depends on thoſe properties, muſt likewiſe exiſt no where elſe but in the ideas of the mind. When, therefore, that intuitive knowledge of external things, adduced by the Materialiſts, as a demonſtration of their exiſtence, can, in fact, inform us of things only that exiſt in the mind, how *then* can the adherents of this ſect infer, from ſuch knowledge, the exiſtence of a whole external world, of which they cannot inſtance a ſingle property, and, moreover, aſſume a ſenſitive faculty, to make us acquainted with things of which we can have no knowledge at all.

It is, therefore, certain, that there being no external world, no ſenſitive faculty can exiſt, that, conſequently, the world of ideas is the only world of realities, and that the endeavours of the Materialiſts, to convert the ideas and operations of our minds into external bodies and mechanical motions, will and can never ſucceed.

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However miſtaken the Idealiſts may be in their notions of things, one of their arguments, which is moſt dangerous to Materialiſm, will, I think, bear out againſt all attacks that may be made upon it, and this is, that all our ideas of things are merely relative.

III. The Spiritualiſts, who agree with the laſt-mentioned ſect, in believing that the true nature of things is known to the intellect only, differ from them as to what they ſhould underſtand by the ſenſitive faculty. And it is in this particular, that they cannot agree even among themſelves.

Thoſe who follow Leibnitz, the greateſt of all Spiritualiſts, naturally aſſume it as a fundamental principle of their ſyſtem, that the world is a compound of ſimple ſubſtances, that our opinion of things being extended and figured, is the reſult of confuſed ideas, and that the ſenſitive faculty, which furniſhes theſe ideas, ſo far from being the true ſource of real knowledge, is rather a hindrance to the intellect, which alone has the power to contemplate things as they are, and to procure ſubſtantial knowledge of the world.

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As to the place where this faculty reſides, the diſſentions among theſe Philoſophers are ſtill greater.

Some of them think, that it muſt have its ſeat in the body, or the organization of the body, and conſider it as a faculty adapted to receive impreſſions, and to communicate them to the incorporeal ſoul, which as ſuch cannot be properly ſaid to admit of impreſſions, and, therefore, of having in itſelf a ſenſitive faculty.

Others aſſert, that it muſt be in the ſoul, in order to receive impreſſions made on the organization. Theſe, indeed, allow it to be a property of the ſoul itſelf, but they conſider it as a mere accidental property, which vaniſhes away as ſoon as the union between the body and ſoul is reſolved.

And ſtill others are of opinion, that it muſt be at once in the ſoul and body. Theſe men take it for a faculty of being affected by external things, through the medium of organization; and the organization, they think, inſtead of enlarging the views of the mind, rather tends to confine them within the circle of ſenſible objects.

IV. The Eclecticks who ſaw, that the abſurd opinions of the Alexandrine and other ſchools could not be reformed, unleſs implicit belief were diſcarded and free enquiry ſet on foot, have, in order to carry on the work of truth with better ſucceſs, firmly reſolved not to pay implicit deference to any philoſophic ſect or leader, and to conſtruct ſyſtems of opinions which ſhall be properly and peculiarly their own; but as to the ſubject of our preſent enquiry, however they may diſallow the authority of great names, yet they muſt neceſſarily either aſſume a ſenſitive faculty in man or not. In the laſt caſe they will be Idealiſts, although they proteſt againſt this ſect; and in the firſt, they muſt either conſider the ſenſitive faculty as the only ſource of genuine knowledge, and confirm Materialiſm, or grant, that beſides this faculty, the powers of reaſon and intellect contain other ſources of genuine and different knowledge. In this caſe, they muſt be Spiritualiſts, and place the ſenſitive faculty either in the organizations alone, or in the ſoul alone, or in both together, and thus give additional currency to the controverted

verted opinions of thoſe very ſects which they pretend to reform.

V. The Sceptics, eſpecially thoſe of them who proceed upon principles, perceiving ſo many irregular and diſcordant opinions defended concerning the ſenſitive faculty, thus accoſt the defenders:

You are conſtructing ſyſtems of opinion. Are you then agreed wherein truth may conſiſt? Have you already diſcovered a criterion by which you may judge whether or not your ideas of things agree with the things which they repreſent. No, you have not. And what is more, you never will diſcover ſuch a criterion; for your ideas of things are not the things themſelves, but merely copies of them. Can you, then, lay aſide theſe ideas for a few moments and compare the copy with the original? No, you cannot. For whatever you view, you muſt neceſſarily view it through the medium of your ideas. All compariſon therefore is impoſſible. A criterion of truth is impoſſible, and all your controverſies, together with all your opinions concerning the ſenſitive faculty and other uncertain points, will never convince us, nor interrupt by

vain diſſentions, the ſuperior tranquillity of our minds.*

From this comparative view of the various opinions hitherto maintained concerning the faculties of ſenſe, underſtanding, and reaſon, it will, I hope, clearly appear; firſt, that Philoſophers have not yet ſucceeded in determining accurately and in an univerſally evident manner, what we are to underſtand by the faculty of ſenſe, and that it is ſtill uncertain whether or not this faculty can furniſh ſuch materials as can admit of being modified into ideas of immaterial exiſtences, different from the operations of the human mind. Secondly, that want of ſucceſs in this attempt is the grand cauſe why we have received to this day, but very imperfect accounts of the intellect, and that it is ex-

* It might be objected, that the five philoſophical parties above adduced, diſtinguiſh themſelves by a ſtill greater variety of different opinions than I have mentioned. But who is able to determine all the deviations of ſentiment amidſt ſo much confuſion? It may be further added, that Materialiſm, Idealiſm, Spiritualiſm, and Scepticiſm, are merely Ideals, which can only be approached, but never reached. But even a mere inclination to the opinions of theſe ſects, as it is more imperceptible, appears the more plauſible, and is, on that account, the more dangerous, ſince the confuſion not only remains the ſame, but alſo receives a greater appearance of truth.

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tremely doubtful whether or not this faculty can form any ſolid judgments concerning immaterial exiſtences. Thirdly, that the incorrect and ambiguous deſcriptions of ſenſe and intellect have produced as incorrect and ambiguous deſcriptions of reaſon, and that therefore we have no certain authority for aſſigning to this faculty, a power of penetrating into the inviſible regions of immaterial objects. And laſtly, that as it is to ſenſe, intellect, and reaſon, that we are indebted for all our knowledge, and as theſe faculties are not yet completely underſtood, we need not therefore wonder that the limits of what can be known by man are ſtill unſettled, and of courſe either boldly tranſgreſſed, or too fearfully ſhunned, and this in matters which not only can but ought to be known.

To this hiſtorical ſketch of philoſophic opinions it may be objected—that it is unſupported by authority; but this Treatiſe being addreſſed to the learned, the cauſe of truth will, I hope, loſe nothing by this deficiency, which may be eaſily remedied as ſoon as it ſhall be thought neceſſary. My principal aim is brevity, and a rigorous accu-

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racy in quoting names and paſſages would have very conſiderably encreaſed the ſize of this work.—Some may think that the diſſentions of philoſophers are not ſo great as I have deſcribed them. Suppoſe them not ſo great; What is the reaſon of this? Has any one of thoſe parties gained a complete victory over the others? Is evidence become ſtronger or conviction more unſhaken? No. The reaſon of it is, the prevailing indifference towards the ſcience of Metaphyſics; a certain fear of loſing quickly thoſe conqueſts which it requires much labour and toil to make in this field, and a general deſire of excelling rather in matters of Natural Philoſophy, where a more certain reputation may be gained with more eaſe and at much leſs expence.—It is thought by ſome, that Materialiſm, Spiritualiſm, Idealiſm, and Scepticiſm muſt die away of themſelves, now that we have formed the happy reſolution of bringing every thing to the teſt of experiment, and that, therefore, the beſt thing we can do is to leave them to themſelves and their fate, without meddling any further in theſe controverſies. But I have clearly ſhown already, when deſcribing the principles of the

the Eclecticks, that whoever would philoſophiſe on the human mind, muſt neceſſarily fall into the hands of ſome one or other of theſe ſects, and when he comes to ſee, that the very contrary is aſſerted by an oppoſite party, to thoſe truths of which he is perſuaded, it would be very unphiloſophical not to examine who is wrong and who right; or to ſuppoſe, that the opinion of his opponent will die away of itſelf, merely becauſe he leaves him to himſelf and to his fate. The excuſe that two men cannot always be of the ſame opinion, is very ſuperficial when applied to the fundamental parts of a ſcience, ſuch as ſenſe, underſtanding, and reaſon. Two oppoſite opinions regarding any of theſe three points, if they admit of any plauſible defence, give a direct evidence of the weak ſtate in which the philoſophy of the human mind ſtill lies, and loudly call upon every friend of truth and ſcience ſeriouſly to inveſtigate the cauſe of that never ceaſing repugnance in ſentiment, which muſt neceſſarily reſide in the very vitals of the ſcience, or in the moſt hidden texture of human thoughts.

To judge the better of what I am ſtill to treat, I muſt beg the reader to recollect, that I have introduced thoſe philoſophic opinions, merely with a view to point out ſome of the occaſions which have contributed towards the diſcovery of the Kantean principles. Profeſſor Kant wanted to aſcertain, among other things, the bounds of human knowledge, particularly with regard to the exiſtencies of immaterial objects; or in other words, to find out a general criterion of what is knowable. He obſerved, as already mentioned, that this criterion muſt be looked for within and not without man, and that, therefore, an enquiry into the nature of the reaſoning, judging, and ſenſitive faculties muſt be attempted. He undertook this enquiry, but firſt conſulted the opinions of other philoſophers concerning the preciſe nature of thoſe mental faculties. Wherein theſe opinions conſiſted, and in what light Kant has conſidered them, I have already explained. It remains, therefore, that agreeably to the plan I have laid down, I ſhould now acquaint the reader with thoſe farther meaſures which Profeſſor Kant thought the moſt proper to adopt in order to anſwer the queſtion,

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which I have noticed above, namely, " What is knowable ?"

Profeſſor Kant above all, conſidered maturely, how an anſwer to this important queſtion muſt be qualified, if it ſhall be of any uſe to the world. He ſaw, that it muſt either be ſo framed in point of thought and expreſſion as to be univerſally underſtood and acknowledged as true, by every thinking man who is no ſtranger to the idiom of the language in which it is conveyed, or it will encreaſe the number of diſappointments in metaphyſical purſuits, over which the Sceptic triumphs, as an ocular confirmation of his doctrines. In ſhort, the anſwer muſt be univerſally evident. The endeavours at univerſal evidence in principle, amidſt ſo much contrariety of opinion, have, indeed, been ranked among the vain attempts ſometimes made to unite the various religious Creeds of the Chriſtian churches under one head. But thoſe men who entertain ſo unfavourable an opinion of the poſſibility of univerſal evidence in principle, ought to confine this opinion to the lower claſſes of a nation, where the gradations of knowledge and ignorance may render a diſcordance of thought

and principle unavoidable, although it muſt be granted, that even in theſe darker regions, certain truths regarding what is right and wrong, &c. are univerſally acknowledged and reſpected. If thoſe men apply the ſame opinion to the caſe of ſpeculative philoſophy, or the preceding queſtion under conſideration, and think that univerſal evidence is equally impoſſible in both, they may be inſtanced as the beſt refutation of their own opinion. For, by thus freely declaring their opinion on a ſpeculative point, which the poſſibility of univerſal evidence certainly is, they clearly ſhow that they muſt be in poſſeſſion of ſome arguments in favour of that opinion. Now, if theſe arguments are ſolid and completely true, they have, by their own example, demonſtrated the poſſibility of univerſal evidence in ſpeculative philoſophy; if, on the other hand, they contain not the full truths, they will be of little uſe in demonſtrating the contrary. And, indeed, can any man ſpeak, or write, or conſtruct a ſyſtem of opinions, or correct the opinions of other men, without *at leaſt imagining*, that the premiſes from which he deduces his reaſonings are univerſally granted. If he does not imagine this,

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he cannot hope to be underſtood, much leſs to give or receive conviction. Beſides, there is a fact which moſt unequivocally proves, that ſpeculative philoſophy is ſuſceptible of univerſal evidence. Is not Logic a ſpeculative ſcience? Is it not complete in its parts, and has not each of its eſſential parts, for many centuries paſt, been completely underſtood and univerſally acknowledged as true? Why then, ſhould Metaphyſics, or that ſcience which treats of exiſtencies inacceſſible to the ſenſes, and which has its place in Speculative Philoſophy immediately after Logic, be incapable of equal evidence? Why may it not afford mankind a preciſe and clear knowledge, if not of the remarkable phenomena in the inviſible world, at leaſt of the true bounds of our ignorance. The queſtion, therefore, "What is knowable?" is certainly capable of an univerſally evident anſwer: and Profeſſor Kant very juſtly demands that it ſhould be ſo.

But how is this poſſibility to be realiſed?—The firſt ſtep which Profeſſor Kant took to realiſe it, was, that of endeavouring to ſecure himſelf from mixing in his arguments—the principles of Materialiſm, Spiritualiſm, Idealiſm, and Scepticiſm,

becauſe ſuch a mixture can never produce univerſal evidence. The ſecond ſtep which he took was this; " he endeavoured to get, if poſſible, at that point of deluſion which has prevented theſe parties from an union in principle." And this point of deluſion he diſcovered to lie in their reſpective methods of philoſophiſing.

In order to determine the nature and ſtrength of the powers of Reaſon, Underſtanding, Senſe, and Knowledge.

I. The Materialiſts have examined very minutely the knowledge which they have of external objects, and of the organization of man. To this they have joined an enquiry into memory and the aſſociations of the imagination, and from the knowledge they had acquired of theſe objects, they derived the nature and extent of the various mental faculties.

II. The Idealiſts finding that the ſenſes are liable to deceive, had nothing real left as objects of enquiry, but the ideas in their minds; they derived therefore the nature and extent of the mental faculties from their knowledge of the world of ideas.

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III. The Spiritualiſts, being perſuaded that they not only have knowledge of material, but alſo of immaterial objects, derived from this knowledge the nature and extent of the mental faculties.

IV. The Sceptics, from the inconſiſtency and fallacy which they had obſerved in human deſcriptions of things, formed ſuch notions of the mental faculties, as diſtinguiſh the ſect to which they belong.

Profeſſor Kant obſerved, that in explaining the Power of Knowledge, which comprehends Reaſon, Underſtanding, and Senſe, it would be erroneous to derive it from our pretended knowledge of the nerves, the brain, the viſible and inviſible worlds, and that we ought firſt of all to enquire into the true nature and conſtitution of this power, before we can poſſibly aſcertain what the nature and extent of that knowledge is, which we are able to acquire of the nerves, the brain, the viſible and inviſible worlds. Thoſe four ſects, as already mentioned, did not enquire firſt into the nature and conſtitution of the Power of Knowledge, in order to determine thereby the nature and extent of that knowledge which can be acquired of the objects

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in the world. They did juſt the contrary. They firſt formed arbitrary notions of the eſſential properties of the things around them, and from theſe notions they derived the nature and extent of the Power of Knowledge. The Materialiſts having diſcovered, that an eſſential property of the things we know is extenſion, converted the Power of Knowledge into a mechanical faculty of organization, and confined it to the field of extended beings. The Idealiſts, obſerving that extenſion can be no eſſential property of real objects, denied the exiſtence of the external world, and made the Power of Knowledge conſiſt in reaſon, or the intellect, which faculty, they think, can alone acquaint us with the true nature of objects. It is on the ſame principle, that the Spiritualiſts, from their pretended knowledge of ſpirits and immaterial objects, whoſe eſſential property they have diſcovered to be ſimplicity, aſſert a power of knowing ſpirits and immaterial objects, as well as material, and make this power to be a compound of the faculties of ſenſe, underſtanding, and reaſon. The Sceptics pretending to know nothing certainly of the true and eſſential properties of things, do not agree

agree concerning what they ſhall make of the Power of Knowledge. Theſe four ſects confounded two queſtions, which are eſſentially different from one another, namely, the queſtion, "Wherein conſiſts the Power of Knowledge?" with the queſtion, "Wherein conſiſts the eſſence of the things which we know?" Inſtead of anſwering the firſt, they endeavoured to anſwer the laſt. They thought the beſt way to determine the power and extent of human knowledge, was to penetrate as deeply as poſſible into the eſſence or nature of things, and to ſee how far we could proceed in our knowledge of them. But this was the moſt perverted method they could have poſſibly choſen. For we muſt evidently endeavour, firſt, to get completely acquainted with thoſe conditions in man, which render knowledge poſſible, or make the conſtitution of the Power of Knowledge, before we can even think of determining what, and how much this power can know of the eſſential properties or eſſence of things. But thoſe conditions which make knowledge poſſible, muſt lie in the knowing faculty, and not in the things known. It is, therefore, perfectly and completely vain, to inſtitute deep enquiries into

into the objects of the visible and invisible world, into the nerves, fibres, and vibrations, in order to learn what the Power of Knowledge is. All these things are merely objects of knowledge; they cannot even afford so much information, as to tell us wherein knowledge consists, much less wherein the *Power* of Knowledge may consist.

I have dwelt upon this topic for a considerable time, because I thought it of the last importance to Philosophy, and because I find, that even our greatest philosophers, for whom I profess the highest regard, and whose names I shall mention, as soon as a more favourable opportunity occurs, have adopted the same erroneous methods of philosophising. They indeed analyze the powers of the human mind with great skill and ingenuity, and deserve, on this account, to be diligently studied; but it is a misfortune, that these great men could not give any description of those powers, without deriving it, at least in part, from their supposed knowledge of material or immaterial objects.

Professor Kant shews, that, in describing or examining the powers of Reason, Understanding, and Sense, or the Power of Knowledge, we have nothing

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at all to do with a ſimple ſpirit, or the ſoul, and with compound ſubſtances, or the external things. We have only to conſider certain faculties, by which we know, reaſon, and judge of theſe things. Theſe faculties are objects of conſciouſneſs, and muſt be conſidered ſeparately and independently of the qualities of thoſe things which are known by means of them. If theſe faculties are completely examined, and accurately underſtood, then and only then ſhall we be able to judge, whether ſuch faculties can belong merely to the organization, or to a ſimple ſpirit.

When any work on the powers of the mind, therefore, contains aſſertions of the following deſcription—If we conceive the mind immaterial, of which, I think, we have very ſtrong proofs, we ſhall find it difficult to affix a meaning to impreſſions made upon it; or, Thought is a property of the nervous ſyſtem—we may reckon upon it, that ſuch a work, however acute and juſt the deductions be which it contains, is yet built upon a foundation, which, involving an eſſential fault, muſt make the whole ſuperſtructure totter, and for ever exclude it from univerſal approbation.

Is it then poſſible to explain the Power of Knowledge in general, without having recourſe to an accurate and extenſive knowledge of things? Can we get well acquainted with any power, without examining very accurately, and very minutely, thoſe effects which it produces?

Profeſſor Kant by no means denies, that we know powers only by means of their effects; he is far from aſſerting, that our examination of theſe effects ſhould not be accurate and minute; but he is totally againſt all accurate and minute examination of any ſingle immaterial, as well as material object, as far as it reſpects our preſent purpoſe. An individual and minute knowledge of one or more individual bodies or ſpirits, is perfectly uſeleſs towards aſcertaining the Power of Knowledge in general. To find out the true nature of this power, we muſt abſtract from all particular knowledge of particular objects, and examine the properties of knowledge in general, or the common nature of all our knowledge.

But, ſay you, it ſeems impoſſible to examine the common nature of knowledge, without having recourſe to particular knowledge of particular things.

things. It really does ſeem ſo. But it is in fact otherwiſe; and I may boldly aſſert, that we have here a remarkable exception to the maxim, "That every thing is eaſy in theory but difficult in practice;" for here really ſomething appears very difficult, nay, almoſt impoſſible, in theory, which yet is very eaſy in practice, as is ſhewn in the Extract of Kant's Principles, which will preſently follow.

Suppoſing, therefore, that it is poſſible to examine the common nature of knowledge, without calling to our aſſiſtance minute details of particular knowledge, regarding a great variety of particular objects; it will, I hope, be clear, at leaſt, that we ought, at all events, to begin with conſidering this common nature of knowledge, if ever we would get rightly acquainted with the ſpecific difference of particular knowledge, and the power of knowledge in general. And this I affirm upon the principle, that to know the eſſential properties of any power, and thoſe we ſhould always examine firſt of a power, we muſt find out the common nature of its effects.

How then can we diſcover the common properties of all human knowledge, and exhibit them in a manner univerſally intelligible and evident? Upon a complete and accurate anſwer to this queſtion, as I have juſt ſhewn, immediately depends all the poſſibility of giving an univerſally intelligible and ſatisfactory explanation of what conſtitutes the true and comprehenſible nature of the Power of Knowledge, or the faculties of Reaſon, Underſtanding, and Senſe. For if the moſt common properties of all our knowledge be not aſcertained, the moſt common exertions, or the moſt eſſential nature of their cauſe, which is the Power of Knowledge, cannot be clearly and completely underſtood, and if the Power of Knowledge remain in part a ſecret, the notions we have of Reaſon, Underſtanding, and Senſe, the component parts of that power, cannot be accurate and complete, but muſt, of courſe, remain deficient and partial.

I ſhall, therefore, endeavour to exhibit that method of enquiry which Profeſſor Kant has uſed in his attempts to diſcover, the common properties of human knowledge. I doubt not but the reader will find his mode of philoſophiſing on this impor-

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tant ſubject highly intereſting, and worthy of attention, eſpecially as his principal aim is univerſal evidence, and as he is, of courſe, obliged to keep his arguments and views of things equally diſtant from thoſe of the four diſſenting parties in the philoſophic world.

But as I perceive that I cannot well avoid entering into ſome detail of his fundamental principles of theoretical philoſophy, in order to particulariſe his method of enquiring into the common characteriſtics of human knowledge, I muſt beg the reader to remark, firſt, that among the Kantean Principles which I am going to adduce, ſome more will occur than ſeem neceſſary to this end; but having promiſed in this Treatiſe to give a general introduction to Kant's Philoſophy, and not merely to his ſpeculations on human knowledge; and finding it neceſſary, for the ſake of order and perſpicuity, to put his theoretical principles one near another as cloſely as poſſible, I thought it not improper to give a complete view of all his ſpeculative principles, that is, as far as is neceſſary to thoſe references which are eſſential in order to illuſtrate the reſults of his philoſophy concerning

Morals

Morals and Religion, as well as his manner of inveſtigating ſpeculative objects. I muſt remark, that the principles which I ſhall adduce are altogether founded upon the *Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon*, ſome of them being tranſlated, and others derived from it, as neceſſary conſequences, ſo as to form a complete introductory view of this important work, upon which all the other Kantean writings are grounded. I muſt further remark, that this view of the Kantean principles is not at all intended to convince the reader of their truth; for this would require a ſeparate work *. I have completely done my duty in enumerating them ſo as to render it viſible by which way they have been diſcovered, and how they can lead to thoſe reſults which I ſhall explain in the ſequel of this work.

I ſhall, accordingly, delineate the method of inveſtigating the common properties of human knowledge, as well as thoſe objects neceſſarily connected with ſuch an inveſtigation, in the following poſitions which I have marked out with numbers in order to make occaſional references.

* I have almoſt completed a work of the above deſcription, and ſhall announce it more particularly in the courſe of theſe pages.

KANT's

SOME REMARKS

ON

PROFESSOR KANT's PRINCIPLES

OF

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE Principles of Profeſſor Kant, which I have juſt laid before the reader, are fully demonſtrated in the Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon. They do not, however, make one half of thoſe important Principles which that work attempts to eſtabliſh, and which, in the opinion of the acuteſt German Philoſophers and Mathematicians, it has actually eſtabliſhed with extraordinary ſucceſs. I have ſelected the above principles, becauſe they will enable me clearly to ſhew what influence the Kantean Philoſophy will have on ſome of thoſe ſciences which have a direct reference to the moſt

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ſacred intereſts of mankind, and which are the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, Morals, and Religion conſidered within the bounds of Reaſon. The reſt of Kant's Theoretical Principles, contained in the above work, are equally important in another reſpect, becauſe they preciſely determine the number and extent of thoſe of our fundamental doctrines of mechanical and experimental ſcience, which have their origin in the mind alone, but which are ſtill generally and very erroneouſly derived from experience. But theſe principles, for the ſake of brevity, I have thought proper to omit in this introduction.

ANSWER

To ſome of the Objections which may naturally ariſe from the defenceleſs ſtate in which the above Principles of Kant are placed.

The above extract will perhaps be charged with great obſcurity. I confeſs it is obſcure; but the ground of this lies in the want of demonſtration. To underſtand clearly the meaning of hidden truths, it is not ſufficient for us to have them ſtated, we muſt alſo diſtinctly ſee the arguments upon which they

they are founded. But the arguments upon which Kant's Principles, above adduced, are founded cannot have a place in a mere introduction; it is, therefore, no wonder that ſome obſcurity does hang over them in this extract, although I have endeavoured to be very explicit. However, the obſcurity is not ſo great as to preclude all light. I am confident, that ſome rays of truth will occaſionally ſtrike the reader, and convince him that Kant's Philoſophy deſerves, at leaſt, to be ſtudied and examined; which is what this Treatiſe principally aims at. I have ſtrictly adhered to Kant's language, in order to reconcile the reader gradually to the ſound of ſome of the terms which he uſes, and which may appear ſomewhat unfaſhionable. But this circumſtance will perhaps occaſion conſiderable cenſure. I muſt, therefore, remark, that as Kant has drawn to light whole ſpecies of new phenomena in the mind, he had only two ways to expreſs them, either that of inventing words, or that of uſing our ſtore of philoſophic terms as well as he could. He choſe the latter, and borrowed his language from Ariſtotle and Plato, wherever neceſſity required it,

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and this particularly, becauſe thoſe great men had fallen upon ſimilar ideas, and invented terms to convey them, not unknown to the ſcholar. Some of our modern philoſophers have indeed diſcarded thoſe terms of Ariſtotle and Plato as ſcholaſtic traſh. But had they perceived to what diſcoveries the imperfect ideas that were in the terms of theſe great men would lead if properly inveſtigated, they would not have done ſo. In ſhort, the few unfaſhionable words which Kant is obliged to uſe for conveying his thoughts preciſely and clearly, are the moſt proper which he could find, and, I confeſs, I know of no better. However, if any of the learned can propoſe an improvement in this reſpect, let him not conceal it; for to improve the language of philoſophers, is certainly doing great ſervice to philoſophy. The moſt eſſential objection that will be made to the above extract is, that Kant's Syſtem leads into Scepticiſm, becauſe it maintains that the figures in which we ſee the external objects cloathed, are not inherent in thoſe objects, but only in our ideas of theſe objects, and that conſequently ſpace is ſomething within, and not without, the mind. Scepticiſm is imputable

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to that ſyſtem only, which aims directly or indirectly at the foundation of our real and ſubſtantial knowledge. Whatever other meanings the term Scepticiſm may have, it is chiefly in this, that it can throw cenſure on the Kantean doctrine regarding ſpace. Without proving the truth of this doctrine, I ſhall endeavour to ſhow that it has no tendency to encourage Scepticiſm, as deſcribed: for, firſt, ſuppoſe the figures of external things lie only in our ideas of them, does it then follow that our knowledge of external things is, therefore, uncertain and doubtful? Will not the ſame external exiſtencies produce the ſame impreſſions on our organs, and will not the ſame impreſſions on our organs occaſion the ſame figured ideas of them, eſpecially as the ſynthetical functions of our ſpontaneity, like thoſe of every other power, are bound down to certain laws, and muſt accordingly, on the ſame occaſions, operate in the ſame manner? And ſo long as the ſame external things excite the ſame ideas in our minds, what elſe do we want to guide us through life? Can we ſay, that, in ſuch an order of things, we could not know what would hurt our well being, or promote our happineſs?

Can we alledge that our knowledge of the external world would become leſs charming and ſublime? Can there be any thing more ſublime than to know that we live in a world whoſe various objects are preſented to the mind under an immenſe variety of regular pictures and proportions, and of which we are yet allowed to know nothing more than that it exiſts, and that we exiſt in it? Is there in this awful obſcurity, which every where ſurrounds us, nothing ſublime? and is it not worth while to gather the ſtricteſt information of all the impreſſions which it is making upon our ſenſes? Beſides, have not philoſophers already univerſally granted that colour and ſolidity are, properly ſpeaking, not in the things, but in our ſenſes, and that only the cauſes of colour and ſolidity, which are always different from their effects, lie in the things ſaid to be ſolid and coloured? To ſay, that if there be no ſpace without, it is abſurd to travel or meaſure diſtances, may be pleaſant ridicule upon this doctrine, but as an argument it is exceedingly ſuſceptible of the ſame ridicule, and, in fact, it is no argument at all; for ridicule proves nothing. The myſtery which ſurrounds the poſſibi-

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lity of meaſuring diſtances by our own paſſes, or other inſtruments, lies within and not without the mind. Suppoſing ſpace to be external; and this ſuppoſition will not at all clear up that myſtery; for to meaſure diſtances requires a meaſuring faculty, which is no other than the ſpontaneity; and what is more, the idea of ſpace muſt be called to our aſſiſtance, and be in the mind, in order to afford the ſynthetical act of this faculty ſome ſubſtratum upon which it may exerciſe its meaſuring-functions. Here, then, it may be explained how man can travel, or, what is more, how, in travelling, he can meaſure diſtance. The labouring feet know nothing of diſtance, nor are the eyes fitted for ſuch knowledge; for even to ſee, there is required not an eye only, but a faculty of forming ideas. How, therefore, can the ſpontaneity meaſure diſtance? It is, indeed, extraordinary, that the mind ſhould be ſo formed as not only to repreſent the changes affected in our organs, by external powers, in various pictures, without the aid of external ſpace, but alſo to place theſe pictures at a diſtance from one another. But yet this is really the caſe. The diſtance that lies between

a rainbow in the ſky, and the ſpectator on the earth may, like that of every other viſible phenomenon, be preciſely meaſured; and yet every body knows, that the rainbow exiſts no where elſe but in the eye of the ſpectator. How, then, comes the mind to place the idea of a rainbow, which forms originally only a ſet of ſenſations in the eyes, at a mile's diſtance from the idea it has acquired of the place of the body? Both theſe ideas are evidently in the mind, and to meaſure their diſtance, external ſpace is of no uſe; for to this there is requiſite a ſpace in the mind. How can the ſpontaneity by means of theſe three ideas meaſure the diſtance of the two former? To ſay, it can do this becauſe there is an external ſpace, is abſolutely explaining nothing. It is, therefore, pretty clear, that the ſuppoſition of an external ſpace cannot afford a ſolid foundation for ridiculing Kant's doctrine as rendering the travelling or meaſuring of diſtances impracticable; for that ſuppoſition does not in the leaſt explain how the mind can have an idea of travelling or diſtance at all, much leſs how it can conceive a line between things that are more than a full mile apart, and

exiſt

exiſt no where elſe but in the mind. Beſides, from Kant's doctrine of ſpace, it follows, though it had been denied by other Philoſophers, that our intuitions muſt be diſtant from each other, becauſe the form of each intuition is ſpace; two intuitions, therefore, muſt be in two places. It may be further objected, that if there be no external ſpace, there is alſo no external world. But this is concluding by far too much from theſe premiſes. If there be no external ſpace, it will follow that we are not authoriſed to aſſign extenſion to external things, but there will follow no more. Any one acquainted with what ſpace is, and knowing that it originates in the ſtructure of the Receptivity and the ſynthetical act of the ſpontaneity of the mind, will unavoidably be confirmed in the concluſion, that there muſt exiſt an external world. For the receptivity is a mere paſſive faculty, (See Principle ix.) It cannot, as ſuch, produce the materials of which our ſenſible ideas conſiſt; nor can the ſpontaneity do this; for its action is not the producing ſomething from nothing, it is merely connecting. (See Principle x.) Hence, by mere ſpontaneity and receptivity alone we could not arrive at any ideas

ideas at all; for even the materials of which imaginary ideas are compoſed, cannot be produced by either of thoſe faculties, and muſt therefore be given *. But whence could they be given if there was nothing exiſting without us? So far, then, is this doctrine of Kant from leading to the concluſion, that no external world exiſts, that it affords the ſtrongeſt reaſons to conclude the very reverſe. It has been likewiſe remarked, that Kant's ſyſtem, on account of his doctrines concerning ſpace, is very ſimilar to that of Berkeley; but nothing can be more different than the ſyſtems of theſe two great men. Berkeley, indeed, placed ſpace, together with the properties it contains, in the mind, and ſo far he agrees with Kant; but not knowing what to make of ſpace in the mind, he fell into Idealiſm, and has conſtructed a ſyſtem of Philoſophy directly oppoſite to that of Kant. It may be further objected, that Kant's Principles in general, as I have deſcribed them, ſeem to convert the whole procedure of the mind, in perceiving, conceiving, judg-

* Profeſſor Kant proves, that the exiſtence of the external world is ſufficiently ſecured by immediate conſciouſneſs.—How? —this will be ſhown at another time; for it lies not within my plan to prove any thing, but only to explain and to obviate haſty objections.

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ing, and reaſoning, into a ſort of machinery, where perceptions, conceptions, &c. are fabricated in a manner ſomewhat too mechanical; but it ought to be remembered that the moſt reſpectable body of Philoſophers have at all times, and with a remarkable uniſon, allowed the mind to connect thoughts, conceptions, judgments, &c. and that Kant has made but one ſtep farther in the ſame beaten road, and demonſtrated, that the mind not only connects thoughts, conceptions, &c. but alſo the materials of which our ideas are compoſed. Beſides, Profeſſor Kant would not even be underſtood to have diſcovered how the mind by its ſynthetical acts can arrive at any real perception and conception of things; for this would be impoſſible; he has only proved, that by means of them the mind really does arrive at its perceptions and conceptions, &c. The conditions under which the mind perceives can be known, nay, ought to be known, and make a machinery which we muſt call Philoſophy of the Human Mind; but how we can perceive at all by means of thoſe conditions, makes a queſtion which none will propoſe who underſtands its meaning.

Without

Without demonſtrating the truth of any of the Kantean Principles, (for this I ſhall attempt in another Work), I have endeavoured, in the preceding lines, to offer ſome reaſons which might induce the reader not to judge too haſtily regarding Kant's merits, and ſhall now proceed to ſtate what influence his ſyſtem may have on the improvement of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind.

INFLUENCE

INFLUENCE

OF

KANT's PRINCIPLES

ON THE

IMPROVEMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

The Materialiſts, as has been mentioned page 43, convert the mind into matter, and make Reaſon, Underſtanding, and Senſe, to be properties of organization, becauſe according to their fundamental doctrine, all that exiſts is matter—the mind exiſts, therefore it is matter.

The Spiritualiſts having diſcovered immaterial objects convert the mind into a ſpirit, and ſo on.

The Idealiſts change the frame of the mind by depriving it of a faculty to know the external world.

The Sceptics want proof that our ideas agree with the things repreſented by them, and on this account do not firmly believe that the mind has faculties to know any thing with certainty.

From the Principles of Profeſſor Kant laid down in the above extract, it follows:

I. That the Materialiſts are right, when they maintain that we know only material objects*, but wrong, when they aſſert that mind is alſo matter; for we are totally ignorant even as to what matter is, and by aſcribing to it extenſion as an eſſential property, make that a qualification of an external thing, which in fact is only a qualification of ſenſible ideas. (See Principle XXIII.)

II. That the Spiritualiſts are perfectly right, when they inſiſt that there is a great difference between mind and matter; for matter is an object of external ſenſe, and therefore extended; but mind is not an object of external ſenſe, and, therefore, cannot be extended†; but they are completely

* The term object means here all that is different from the mind and its operations, and exiſts external to the mind.

† The reader will remember that extenſion ſuppoſes ſpace, and that ſpace is not a qualification of things, but the mere form of our external intuitions.

miſtaken

miſtaken in converting the mind on this account, into a ſimple ſpirit; for the objective unity under which the mind views itſelf, is the moſt general form of all our conceptions originating in the ſyntheſis of our ſpontaneity. But it is a mere form of thought, and no knowledge of a ſpirit. If it ſhall have any meaning, a variety muſt be comprehended under it, or it muſt be applied to time and ſpace. And thus the doctrine of a ſpirit takes its riſe from miſtaking the ſimple form of our conceptions for the eſſential property of a thing. Of ſpirits we know as little as of matter. They may exiſt, but how they are qualified we know not; for we know not the things themſelves, but only how we are affected by them. See the Extract of Principles.

III. That the Idealiſts are perfectly right when they ſuppoſe that the ſubſtances, or that which is laſting and unchangeable are known by the intellect alone, and not by the ſenſitive faculty; but completely wrong, when they convert our mere ideas of ſubſtances into really exiſting things, and on this account deny the exiſtence of the changeable external world. For a ſubſtance is a mere

category applied to time, or a ſchema of the pure intellect. See Principle LVI. No. 3.

IV. That the Sceptics are perfectly right when they conſider truth as lying in the agreement of our ideas with their objects, but thoroughly miſtaken, when they imagine that the agreement between our ideas and their objects muſt lie in ſimilitude, for ideas are not pictures of things; they can therefore diſplay no degree of reſemblance. See the Principles.

The firſt Influence therefore which Kant's Principles are very likely to exerciſe on our Philoſophic Syſtems regarding the human mind is, that they will moſt effectually remove the faults which lie concealed in their very foundation; for theſe ſyſtems are altogether built, as I have juſt ſhown, on the ſuppoſed knowledge of material and immaterial objects, and the reſemblance between our ideas and the things: the conſequence of which has been, that the mind became transformed either into matter or a ſimple ſpirit; but, according to Kant, we know nothing of the things themſelves; we have, therefore, no ſhadow of reaſon, to ſay

that

that the thing called mind is extended and matter, or ſimple and a ſpirit.

The ſecond Influence will be, that as the foundation gains ſtrength by this reform in our views of things, ſo the ſuperſtructure, the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, will profit by being reſcued from the ſophiſtical inferences that have been made from falſe premiſes. For let any man convert mind into matter or ſpirit, and he will in the firſt caſe be obliged, in order to remain conſiſtent with himſelf, either to place our ſenſitive faculty in the organization, to give it irritability and to make reaſon and the intellect mere properties and powers of the nervous ſyſtem, or, in the laſt, to ſeparate the ſenſitive faculty from the mind, as not becoming an immortal ſpirit and attribute to it, only reaſon and underſtanding to enable it to contemplate things far ſuperior to what are merely terreſtrial; but in a Philoſophic Syſtem of the mind, we have principally to enquire into its perceptive and reaſoning faculties, and, according to Kant, we have nothing more to inveſtigate. In an enquiry of this nature therefore, it is totally improper to conſult the eſſence of things; for of the

eſſence

eſſence of things we can know nothing. It is therefore as falſe to place the ſenſitive faculty in the organization, or in matter, and to make reaſon and the intellect power properties of the nervous ſyſtem, as it is erroneous to exclude the ſenſitive faculty from the ſimple ſoul, and attribute to it only reaſon and the intellect. For it is totally unjuſtifiable to clothe the ſubſtance of the nerves, brain, or ſpirits, of which we know nothing, with extenſion or ſimplicity, and to diſtribute among theſe *baſtard notions*, after having arbitrarily called them into external exiſtence, the various faculties of the mind. According to Kant, the ſenſitive faculty belongs immediately to the faculty of perceiving, and not to the organization, or to a ſimple ſoul. The perceptive faculty of every finite being muſt have ſenſe, that is, it muſt be paſſive with regard to the objects perceived; for theſe objects it cannot produce from nothing, otherwiſe it would be an Almighty Being and not a mere perceptive faculty. The manifeſt advantage, therefore, accruing from Kant's Principles to the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, is, that they aſcertain the extent and limits of this important ſcience.

Accord-

According to them, we exclude from the field of this ſcience, the external things, together with their eſſences, whether material or immaterial, and ſubſtitute in their room our ideas, conceptions, perceptions, notions, judgments, and reaſonings concerning thoſe external things, together with the various faculties of the mind conſidered ſeparately, and conſciouſneſs which makes us acquainted with the exiſtence and perceivable nature of theſe mental phenomena.

I am not ignorant that philoſophers have endeavoured to proceed upon a ſimilar plan, but it is eaſy to demonſtrate that they ſtill continue to mix in their expoſitions of the faculties of the mind, the idea either of matter or a ſimple ſpirit, which unfortunate circumſtance muſt neceſſarily give to their moſt ingenious labours a very ſophiſtical appearance, and prevent them from becoming univerſally evident.

The third beneficial conſequence of the Kantean Principles is, that after the field occupied by the phenomena of the mind is cleared of what does not belong to it, they will explain how to cultivate its various provinces to moſt advantage. It is not

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ſufficient to ſhow in a Philoſophy of the Human Mind, that perceptions are connected with ſenſations, that we can remember things by the laws of mechaniſm or aſſociation, that our thoughts coexiſt or are ſucceſſive, that our underſtanding judges or connects a predicate with a ſubject, that reaſon concludes, and that imagination is the origin of poetry; nor is it ſufficient to ſhow how theſe faculties may be moſt properly educated; nay, even to go ſo far as to demonſtrate to the world, that our ideas of time and ſpace are merely relative, though this is indeed important, becauſe it may lead us to aſcertain the objects of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind; yet, if no more is done, there is, in fact, very little done, and we may, notwithſtanding, remain for a conſiderable time at the mere portals of this ſcience. For not to mention that it is impoſſible to form a correct plan for educating the mental faculties unleſs theſe faculties are properly underſtood, of what avail can it be to explain, how ideas are remembered, how they follow one another, to what faculty they belong, with what ſenſations they are accompanied, and what kind of vibrations muſt concur to produce them,

them, when the grand queſtion is: In what do thoſe ideas conſiſt which are remembered, accompanied by ſenſations, and produced by vibrations? A Philoſophy of the Human Mind ought to anſwer this queſtion firſt, before it ſhould think of attributing ideas to any faculty in the world, or attempt to account for their origin. But this is the very queſtion that has not yet been able to obtain that attention which it deſerves.

The Materialiſts give one anſwer, the Spiritualiſts another; and as theſe anſwers are found to militate againſt each other; they are conſidered by ſome perſons as unanſwerable, and by others as deſerving no anſwer at all, becauſe the ſubject of it is beſt known by conſciouſneſs and immediate feeling. If it be beſt known by immediate feeling, then it cannot be ſo well, or, indeed, not at all known by reaſoning; and, in that caſe, all philoſophiſing on this ſubject is at an end. But the fact is otherwiſe. Our immediate feelings are themſelves objects of ideas, and no object of any idea, unleſs it be itſelf an idea, can afford the leaſt information of what an idea is; nor does conſciouſneſs, when repreſented in an idea tell us, wherein an idea conſiſts,

although it is by the operations of conſciouſneſs, that we know we have ideas, and may arrive at the knowledge of their comprehenſible nature. It is, therefore, in vain to paſs the queſtion over, upon the ſuppoſition that its ſubject is known by immediate feeling, and without making a proper enquiry. But it is alledged that this queſtion is unanſwerable; becauſe the whole matter lies beyond human comprehenſion. Profeſſor Kant obſerves, that there is no phraſe in language more liable to be miſapplied than this. For to make a proper uſe of it, it is neceſſary, that we accurately know the limits of Human Knowledge; but what Philoſopher is there who has deſcribed the limits of Human Knowledge, without having been oppoſed by deſcriptions of a very contrary nature. If, therefore, it is not yet decided what man can know, it is as little ſettled what might lie beyond human comprehenſion.

Profeſſor Kant maintains, that although the eſſence of the things around us will for ever remain incomprehenſible, yet what our ideas and thoughts conſiſt in, can not only be comprehended but can alſo be known. For we do not aſk here how thoughts and ideas are poſſible, but only wherein thoughts and ideas conſiſt, that is, what their com-

component parts are, eſpecially when conſidered in general. It is only by aſcertaining the component parts of ideas and thought in general, that we can ever hope to diſcern that which in our ideas or thoughts of things belongs to the mind from that part of them which belongs to the things, and thus in the end be enabled to guard ourſelves againſt confounding thoughts with things, and things with thoughts, which remarkable confuſion is the only cauſe why the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, as well as all the other branches of ſpeculative ſcience, have met with very little encouragement, though they treat of objects, which in point of importance, exceed all that we know. For let any man confound, for inſtance, in Metaphyſics, the mere forms of thought with forms of things, as Ariſtotle unfortunately did, and the conſequence will be, that although this confuſion could not be laid open by Metaphyſicians of leſs diſtinction than Ariſtotle was, yet it will, ſooner or later, lead to contradictions that muſt finally bring the whole ſcience, where they reſide, into profound contempt, juſt as it has happened with Metaphyſics in our days. But it may be aſked, How can

we reſolve our ideas into parts, ſince theſe airy beings appear to have no parts at all? and how, therefore, can we expect diſtinctly to ſeparate in them what belongs to the mind from that which belongs to the things?—It is erroneous to ſay our ideas have no parts. For they muſt all of them have contents, or elſe they are empty, and this is already one of the parts of which they conſiſt. Again the contents which they include, muſt be arranged according to ſome relations or other, or elſe our ideas would repreſent a disjointed parcel of materials, and not exhibit any entire object, as they really do; and this is already another part which muſt neceſſarily occur in every idea that ſhall deſerve the name of an idea. Theſe two points Philoſophers will grant. But, according to Kant, we muſt not ſtop here. We muſt aſk, What are the general features of the contents of our ideas? Kant anſwers, The contents of our ideas, whatever they may repreſent muſt be a variety. (See Principle VIII.) Even the objective unity and the unities produced by reaſon, cannot ſingly occur in our ideas, provided they are repreſented as the unities, or as the being connected of any variety.

variety. But in our ideas there is not only a variety, there is alſo a connection of the parts of this variety. This connection muſt not be paſſed over. For it contains the key to all Philoſophy of the Human Mind. It originates in the comprehending and conceiving acts of the ſpontaneity, and not in the external things as was hitherto ſuppoſed. All the mental faculties exert connecting actions, they connect varieties into ideas, judgments, and reaſonings. But theſe varieties muſt be given and cannot be produced from nothing. Who can doubt, but that by ſuch a train of reaſoning we muſt in the end arrive at that ſhare which the mind has, and that which the things have in producing knowledge, ideas, conceptions, &c. Only we muſt not perſuade ourſelves that we have diſcovered a conſiſtent and complete ſyſtem of the faculties of the human mind, if we cannot demonſtrate the preciſe number of the primary connecting acts belonging to the underſtanding, to reaſon, and the ſpontaneity of the firſt degree, which I have called apprehenſion, if we have not aſcertained the exact number of the primary conceptions of reaſon and underſtanding, which I have called pure ideas

and

and categories, if we cannot explain what is the general form of human conception, or of what is conceivable, and what the general form of human knowledge, or of what is knowable, or if we are doubtful wherein the receptivity of the mind conſiſts, and know not what to make of time and ſpace. A correct and accurate explanation of any of theſe points will eaſily lead to the diſcovery of all the reſt; but if any of theſe points be not accurately explained, it unavoidably follows, that all the reſt are not properly underſtood. For the phenomena in the mind are ſo cloſely connected, that we either muſt be able to deſcribe them all together, or we can deſcribe none of them rightly. A remarkable inſtance of this truth is, that many of the Philoſophers have fallen upon the opinion, that ſpace is a mere relative notion, or, that it exiſts no where elſe than in the mind. But as they did not know how to account for the origin of this notion, and that it has its ſeat both in the natural conformation of our receptivity and in the ſynthetical acts of the ſpontaneity, they have filled whole volumes with remarks on the mind, which are often inſtructive and ſometimes very amuſing, but which never-

nevertheleſs, give but ambiguous and ſuperficial information concerning what man ſhould underſtand by the terms Reaſon, Underſtanding, and Senſe; which terms expreſs the moſt eſſential ſubjects on which thoſe remarks are made.

I have now ſtated what limits Kant preſcribes to the philoſophy of the Human Mind, what objects he excludes from the conſideration of this ſcience; and of what objects, according to him, it ſhould properly treat, what method he recommends, in order to begin an enquiry into the mind, and what reſults he expects and requires from ſuch an inveſtigation, when accurately inſtituted.

Some of my readers will perhaps remark, that it is eaſier to form plans than execute them. But, nevertheleſs, it is true, that even to contrive ſuch a plan, as Kant has proceeded upon, requires more than ordinary ingenuity.

But if any of my readers ſhould doubt the truth of the Principles of Kant, which I have exhibited in the Extract, I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that I ſhall very ſoon ſubmit them to the judgment of the public, in a work to be entitled, " *An Analyſis of Perceptive and Reaſoning Faculties of the Human Mind*,

Mind, according to Kant's Principles, where I ſhall endeavour to arrange them in an order ſomewhat different from that in which they ſtand in theſe pages, and furniſh each of them with its proper arguments. Theſe principles, as already mentioned, are contained in the Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon. But as this work purſues the ſynthetical method of arguing, which is indeed beſt adapted to the end it endeavours to attain; and as this method is attended with ſome degree of unavoidable obſcurity, I have reſolved to treat of the above principles, without which Kant will never be underſtood, according to the analytical method, which ſeems to admit of more clearneſs, and, on that account, better calculated to remove thoſe difficulties which every man muſt meet with, who attempts to read Kant's Works, without being acquainted with the ſpirit and fundamental principles of his Philoſophy, or without being a Philoſopher of a very penetrating genius.

INFLU-

INFLUENCE

OF

KANT's PRINCIPLES

ON THE

SCIENCE OF MORALS.

The foundation upon which all moral Science muſt ſtand or fall, is the freedom of Human Volition. For if man has no choice in what he does, all the laws and precepts held out to direct and amend his conduct are perfectly uſeleſs.

The principal points to be conſidered in every ſcience of Morals, are therefore theſe:

Has Man a free will?—and

Wherein does a free will conſiſt?

The firſt queſtion is commonly anſwered in the following manner: That man has a free will every body may know from his own feelings. But a Philoſopher muſt not acquieſce in mere feelings; he

muſt examine, whether the notions he receives from his feelings do not involve contradictions. If they do, they deſtroy themſelves, and diſcredit that ſource from which they ſprung.

Wherein conſiſt our notions of a free will?

First, The *Sceptics* abſtain from all explanation, and ſay we have indeed a notion of a free will, but who can tell, that it refers to an object different from itſelf, or that it is not altogether fictitious.

Secondly, The *Fataliſt* goes farther than the Sceptic, and conſiders the notion of liberty as contradictory.

Thirdly, The *Materialiſt*, who ſubjects all action and paſſion of the mind to the laws of motion, affirms our conception of liberty to be without meaning, becauſe all is nature, and proceeds according to the laws of nature.

Thoſe Philoſophers, who undertake to demonſtrate the freedom of the will, divide into the following parties:

1. The Determiniſts maintain, that freedom of the will conſiſts in its dependance on the laws preſcribed by reaſon. But it is objected, ſince reaſon is a mere faculty of concluding, and depends for its

its operations on things external to it, reaſon is not free itſelf, much leſs can it make our will free.

2. The *Equilibriſts* attempt to prove, that freedom of the will conſiſts in its independence, both of the laws of reaſon and ſenſe, and that it lies in a certain middle point, equally remote from the influence of the things around us, and that of our mental faculties.

3. The Theiſts conſider the free will as a faculty to chooſe the beſt;—and

4. The *Philoſophizing Supernaturaliſts* look upon natural freedom to be a faculty to chooſe the worſt, if a ſupernatural light does not interpoſe to direct its choice.

Theſe parties accuſe one another of abſurdity and contradiction in principle; but as they ſeem to feel, that it is much eaſier to refute oppoſite opinions, than to ſubſtitute any better in their room, they have agreed not to engage any longer in fruitleſs controverſies, but to let every body indulge his own opinions in ſecurity. Even the names of Determiniſts and Equilibriſts have diſappeared, and are not much known. Nay, that man, who

ſearches the grounds of theſe diſſentions, is received but with a cold indifference, as warming up old and antiquated debates.

The *Moral Philoſopher*, however, if he is an impartial man, and ſtrives at univerſal evidence, cannot be indifferent towards the labours of his predeceſſors. He muſt carefully inſpect them, in order to improve his own ideas, or to correct theirs, and if he finds that the age, in which he lives, has diſcarded the names of the old moral ſects, but at the ſame time retained ſecretly their opinions and arguments, he is compelled, in order to avoid tedious circumlocutions, to claſs his cotemporaries under the old appellations of *Supernaturaliſts*, *Equilibriſts*, &c. &c. or, what is worſe, to invent a new language, to expreſs the orders to which they belong.

Profeſſor Kant is decidedly of opinion, that, although many ſtrong and ingenious arguments have been brought forward in favour of the freedom of the will, they are yet very far from being deciſive; for they have not refuted the arguments urged by the *Neceſſitarians*, of which the moſt impregnable ſeems to be the following:

All

All human actions are events in time. Every event in time ariſes, and has not exiſted from eternity. Whatever ariſes muſt have a cauſe. But a cauſe in time is an event alſo; it muſt likewiſe have ariſen, otherwiſe its effect would have exiſted from eternity; therefore a cauſe in time muſt have a cauſe itſelf, and ſo on, *ad infinitum*. Hence it follows, that as every human action is an event in time, every human action muſt have a cauſe, that cauſe muſt have another cauſe, and ſo on, *ad infinitum*. But, on ſo long a ſeries of cauſes and effects, human will can make no impreſſion; it is totally impotent as to this; it is, therefore, not free.

To refute this argument, an appeal to mere feeling is of no avail; nor will the moſt ingenious contrivances be able to overturn it, until Kant's principles are called to our aſſiſtance.

Profeſſor Kant treats this ſubject in the following manner: firſt, He ſhews that the notion of a free will involves no contradiction, and that it, therefore, is ſtrictly conformable to all the logical rules concerning the eſſential qualities of a ſound and

good

good notion; ſecondly, He endeavours to prove, that the above notion is not only allowable, but is grounded in facts, that cannot be denied. This laſt point I ſhall farther explain, under the head of Moral Laws; and the firſt I ſhall prove immediately:

The notion of a free will is not contradictory; for although it is beyond all doubt, that every human action, as an event in time, muſt have a cauſe, that cauſe another cauſe, and ſo on, *ad infinitum*; yet it is certain, that the laws of cauſe and effect can have a place there only where time is, for the effect muſt be conſequent upon the cauſe. But time, as well as ſpace, are not properties of things; they are only the general forms under which man is allowed to view himſelf and the world (ſee Principles XII to XXVI). It follows, therefore, that man is not in time and ſpace, although the forms of his intuitive ideas are time and ſpace. If man exiſt not in time and ſpace, he is not influenced by the laws of time and ſpace, among which thoſe of cauſe and effect hold a diſtinguiſhed rank; it is, therefore, no contradiction

to

to conceive, that, in ſuch an order of things, man may be free.

Some of my readers will wonder, that man ſhould not be in time and ſpace. He certainly is as long as we view him, through that medium, by which we are allowed, and neceſſarily muſt view every thing that falls under our attention. But that medium is inherent in the perceiving faculty, and not in the things. It inheres in man, as far as he has a perceiving faculty, and not as far as he is a ſubſtance. Now, as time and ſpace conſtitute that medium, as I ſhall clearly prove in the work I have announced; take away that medium, and, though time and ſpace are no more, man and the world will ſtill remain.

Cuſtom and habit will probably oppoſe theſe notions of time and ſpace. But, firſt, Whoever places the things themſelves in time, forms a notion of the world, which, like that of a ſquare circle, involves contradictory parts, and may be reſolved into two contradictory poſitions, which admit of equal force of argument in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word. For, according to ſuch a notion of things, it can be clearly and fairly proved,

proved, that the world muſt, at the ſame time, have a beginning, and not have a beginning. Secondly, Whoever places the things themſelves in ſpace, without being aware of it, authoriſes the following contradictions, namely, that the things in ſpace are diviſible *ad infinitum*, and not diviſible *ad infinitum*, which two poſitions can likewiſe be proved with equal ſtrength of argument. Thirdly, Whoever aſcribes the laws of cauſe and effect, which connect the phenomena or intuitions in time to the things themſelves, has a contradictory notion of the world, and may be refuted in a clear and unequivocal manner, by being apprized that, from his notion of things, it unavoidably follows, that there is an abſolutely neceſſary being belonging to the world, either as a part or as a cauſe, and that there is no abſolutely neceſſary being exiſting, either within or without the world. Theſe contradictions, in which reaſon entangles itſelf, are as natural and unavoidable as the deluſions of the eye, with regard to the colour of bodies, and the motion of the Sun. They have, for many centuries, exerciſed ſecretly, and without being detected, a fatal influence on moral philoſophy, and our views

of

of the ſurrounding things, and can be removed only by Kant's notions of time and ſpace. Thus much to obviate haſty objections.

I ſhall now proceed to give a ſketch of Kant's notions regarding the ſcience of Morals itſelf.

MORALS.

The Science of Morals muſt, if it ſhall deſerve the name of a Science, conſtitute a conſiſtent whole of evident principles, teaching us, not how we are uſed to conduct ourſelves, but how we ought to act at all times, and under all the circumſtances of life.

As all Principles, forming parts of a Science, muſt have a common nature, which entitles them to a place in one and the ſame ſcience, ſo the Moral Principles muſt have a common nature, which makes them belong to the Science of Morals.

The common nature of Moral Principles, taken together and comprehended in one poſition, will contain the moſt eſſential characteriſtics of all moral precepts, and muſt properly take its place at the head of them all, and, on that account, be called a firſt Principle of Morals.

To know in what ſtate the Science of Morals is at preſent, we need only compare the firſt principles recommended as guides to our conduct.

In order to enable the reader to form ſome previous judgment of Kant's Syſtem of Morals, it will, therefore, be ſufficient to explain wherein his firſt Moral Principle conſiſts, and to compare it with thoſe propoſed by other Philoſophers.

The train of Reaſoning, which leads to the firſt Moral Principle of Kant is the following:*

Man has a power, by means of which he forms ideas of things. In this power we diſtinguiſh two points; firſt, a certain conſtitution, which enables it to produce a certain kind of effects, namely, ideas; and this conſtitution is the faculty of this power; ſecondly, a certain ground that enables it to realize thoſe effects, which it is formed or modified by this faculty to produce, and this ground of energy is properly called power, or, in the preſent caſe, a power of forming ideas.

* The reader will pleaſe to obſerve, that it lies far beyond the limits of this Treatiſe to enter into a minute detail of argument; for this would require a ſeparate volume on Morals. Kant himſelf has found it neceſſary to write a ſeparate book on the firſt principle of Morals, under the title of "Metaphyſics of Morals," which alone conſiſts of 128 pages.

The

The ſtriving of this power to produce ideas, may be called ſimply the ſtriving after ideas. This ſtriving is primary and original. As all ideas conſiſt of two parts (ſee Principle VIII), namely, Variety and Connection, the ſtriving after ideas will either be a ſtriving after variety, or after connection, or what is the ſame, after the matter or the form of an idea.

The ſtriving after variety may be conſidered as the ſtriving after ſomething which muſt be given, and which cannot be produced by the mind. It may be farther called the ſtriving after the being affected of our Receptivity; for no variety can be given, unleſs our Receptivity, which makes an eſſential part in the conformation or faculty of the power of forming ideas, is affected. The ſtriving after the being affected of our Receptivity may be called intereſted in the wideſt ſenſe of the word, becauſe it cannot be ſatisfied, without ſomething is given, in order to affect our Receptivity.

The ſtriving after connection, or the form of our ideas, is intellectual, while that after the matter, or the variety of our ideas, is ſenſual. The former

is ſatisfied by action, and may ſo far be called diſintereſted, in the wideſt acceptation of the term.

Man has a faculty of being determined to action, not only by the things exiſting around him, but alſo by mere ideas of things in general. This faculty, when determined to action by the natural ſtriving after variety and unity, which lies in the power of producing ideas, may be called the faculty of deſiring.

Mere ideas, although their objects be abſent, when they are referred by conſciouſneſs to our ſubject, either leave us in a ſtate of indifference, or in ſome ſort of pleaſure or pain. Mere ideas, therefore, can produce, in our ſubject, a variety of pleaſing or diſagreeable ſenſations.

The faculty of deſiring, when determined by the ſtriving after a variety in our ideas, which excites pleaſing or diſagreeable ſenſations, is ſenſual, and, as all ſenſations are empirical, it may, on that account, be called empirical.

Senſations may be either excited by ideas immediately repreſenting external objects, that is, by external intuitions, or by ideas immediately repreſenting internal objects, that is, internal intuitions; they

they may, therefore, in the firſt caſe, be called external ſenſations, and, in the latter, internal ſenſations.

The faculty of deſiring, when determined to action by external ſenſations, is groſsly ſenſual; but, when determined by internal ſenſations, it is a refined ſenſual faculty of deſiring.

It has been obſerved, in the Abſtract of Kant's Theoretical Principles, page 85, Principle XXXI, that our intuitive ideas, or intuitions of external and internal objects, are connected, by the intellect, into another ſpecies of ideas, called Conceptions. It has been further ſtated, Principle XLVI, that all human conceptions are ultimately combined with the twelve primary forms of all conceptions, which have been called Categories, and which are the original offspring of the pure Intellect. Hence it follows, that the intuitions of external and internal objects, as they are modified anew by the intellect, will produce ſome modifications in the ſenſations which they excite, and in the faculty of deſiring, which I have mentioned to be determined by ſenſations.

When

When the faculty of deſiring is determined by ſenſations excited by intuitions that are modified by the Categories of quantity, it ſtrives after what is perfect in the ſenſible. For if any variety preſented to our ſenſes ſhall be pronounced perfect by our ſenſitive deſires, it muſt form unity, multitude and totality; or, what is the ſame, it muſt be determined by the Categories of Quantity. (See Principle xlvi.)

The faculty of deſiring, when determined by ſenſations excited by intuitions that are modified by the Categories of Quality, ſtrives after ſomething that fills up a time, and is calculated to affect the receptivity in an eaſy or a ſtrong manner, ſo as to produce in it agreeable ſenſations or pleaſure. The reader will recollect, that the Categories of Quality are Reality, Negation and Limitation, and that it is by them that the variety of time is conſolidated into a whole limited by negation, which, as it contains more or fewer degrees, may naturally excite ſtronger or weaker ſenſations of pleaſure. (See Principle xlvi.)

Philoſophers have hitherto conſidered all this under a different point of view; they thought the deter-

determinate realities in time were determined by their *internal nature*. But Kant ſays, we know nothing of the *internal nature of the things themſelves*, and the being determined of the realities in time, that is, of our internal intuitions, originates in the connecting intellect, and not at all in the things; which can only give materials for determination, but not the determination itſelf.

There is another remark which I muſt offer before I proceed, and which is, that the ſenſations modified by the Categories of Quantity, are ſuſceptible of greater dignity than thoſe of Quality, becauſe they may be awakened by the mere idea of form, proportion, and regularity, which the imagination, agreeably to the Categories of Unity, Multitude, and Totality, delineates in mere ſpace. The ſenſations modified by the Categories of Quality, require ſomething more than mere form; they muſt have ſomething given which fills up time and ſpace; they are excited more by the gold or the materials of a ſtatue, than by the art of the Statuary. The deſiring faculty, influenced by the former of the ſenſations, inclines to diſintereſtedneſs, and, when properly cultivated, may pave the way

way to virtue; but, when influenced by the latter, it may lead to intereſtedneſs and vice.

The faculty of deſiring, when determined by ſenſations that are modified by the Categories of Relation, ſtrives. (Principle xlvi.)

(1.) After the continuance of agreeable feelings, and of that exiſtence which is ſuſceptible of ſo much pleaſure. We deſire this, when an intuition preſents itſelf to our view which is determined by the Category of ſubſtance, where we contemplate ſomething that laſts and braves the viciſſitude of its properties. It is from this deſire we derive the natural anxiety for the preſervation of life.

(2.) After intereſted activity. This may be thus illuſtrated: All events in the world work upon our feelings, and either excite pleaſure or pain. All events in the world have their cauſes. Now, two intuitions, of which the one exhibits an agreeable event, and the other its cauſe, and which, therefore, are determined by the Category of cauſe and effect,

fect, induce our desiring faculty, in a natural manner, to procure or realise such causes as produce events pleasing to our feelings. But to be thus active in favour of our feelings is to act interestedly.

(3.) After interested company or society. A number of intuitions representing a number of men sitting one near another, and mutually producing in each other agreeable sensations, by action and re-action, naturally make us desire to be of their party; but this is a desire after interested company occasioned by intuitions that are modified and determined by the Category of mutual concurrence. This is the source of the desire of propagation.

There now remain the Categories of Modality to be considered. But as these Categories, as I have observed in the Extract of Kant's Principles, see page 107, do not add any determination or modification to the objects of our ideas, it is evident that on this account they cannot, in any manner, modify or determine our desires after sensible va-

rities. They ſerve, however, to repreſent the deſiring faculty under three different points of view, and to direct our enquiries into its nature. The Categories of Modality are Poſſibility, Exiſtence, Neceſſity. When we view the faculty of deſiring under the Category of Poſſibility, we conſider its form, that ſtructure and conſtitution, which renders it poſſible that it can deſire at all, or find any thing deſirable. When we view it under the Category of Exiſtence, we conſider it in a ſtate of actual deſire, and when we contemplate it through the Category of Neceſſity, we conſider it not only in a ſtate of actual deſire, but alſo as determined in its deſires by the unalterable laws of its conſtitution, or, what is the ſame, as deſiring neceſſarily or inſtinctively.

The reader will perceive here the uſe of the Categories and their ſchemata. Without having diſcovered the exact number and the true nature of theſe remarkable notions, not only the diviſion of human deſires muſt be deficient, but alſo the nature and real objects of each of our deſires muſt neceſſarily be miſrepreſented; however, this may

be

be diſguiſed by the ſplendid language of popular Philoſophy.

We have completely conſidered thoſe objects of our deſires which are modified by the intellect, it remains now to examine whether or not reaſon has any ſhare in determining our faculty of deſiring.

Reaſon, as I have already ſhewn, likewiſe modifies our intuitions of external or internal objects. It, namely, connects the Categories into ideas; (ſee Principle lxxxvi.) and as the Categories modify our intuitions, it follows, that Reaſon muſt do the ſame.

What kind of modification is it that the intuitions or the objects of our deſires receive from Reaſon?

Thoſe of our intuitions repreſenting a totality in time, which is always conditioned, or, limited by the intellect, are freed by reaſon from theſe limits, and extended into boundleſsneſs; thoſe exhibiting a reality in time, limited by negations, are repreſented as admitting of infinite degrees; thoſe exhibiting a ſubſtance in time, which is ever circumſcribed in duration and properties, are repre-

ſented, as having infinite duration, &c. thoſe exhibiting a cauſe in time, which is determined by a preceding cauſe, are repreſented as determined by an infinite train of preceding and ſurrounding cauſes; thoſe exhibiting a whole of things in time, mutually working upon each other, which is limited by the underſtanding on every ſide, are repreſented by reaſon as a whole, whoſe parts are innumerable, whoſe connections are infinitely multiplied, and whoſe co-exiſtence and co-herence is boundleſs. (See Principle c, to ci.)

Reaſon, therefore, by excluding all limits from the objects repreſented in our intuitions, renders our deſires, which are determined by them, boundleſs.

All the objects modified by reaſon and the intellect taken together, form a whole, which may be denominated the grand object of human happineſs, provided thoſe objects recommend themſelves by exciting pleaſing ſenſations.

The deſire of happineſs, or, of being affected in an agreeable manner by objects, determined by reaſon and the intellect, is ſenſual; becauſe it depends on ſenſations; it is rationally ſenſual, becauſe reaſon

ſon modifies its objects ; it is natural to every man, becauſe no man can be indifferent to the ſenſations impreſſed upon him by his ideas of the ſurrounding world ; but it is intereſted, becauſe it can be ſatisfied only by ſomething which is given ; it is not free, becauſe it depends upon things that do not ſtand at the command of man ; and it is boundleſs, becauſe it aims at an abſolute totality of agreeable feelings, which all the treaſures of this globe, and all the arts and contrivances of men cannot procure.

That ſcience which points out thoſe objects that affect man in a pleaſing manner, and ſuggeſts the beſt means of procuring them, is the doctrine of happineſs, and that ſyſtem of rules which teaches how we ſhould uſe our reaſon in order to make ourſelves happy, is the doctrine of prudence.

Neither the doctrines of prudence nor of happineſs can contain any general laws to guide the behaviour of reaſonable beings ; for they are built upon experience ; and experience, as it extends only to a ſmall number of caſes, can never be the ſource of general laws ; they cannot impoſe any obligation upon any individual member of ſociety ;

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for it is abſurd to command how a man ſhall be happy, ſince every man has a peculiar manner of being affected, and a different idea of happineſs. They are the genuine abettors of ſordid and refined intereſt; and as all manner of ſenſual intereſt corrupts the purity of moral ſentiment, the changeable doctrines of prudence and happineſs ought not to be confounded with the unalterable laws of Morality.

Man is a compound of reaſon and ſenſe, and he is conſcious that his faculty of deſiring is either determined by reaſon or ſenſe. When our deſires are determined by ſenſe, they depend on feelings, when by reaſon, they depend on ideas of general laws.

Theoretical Reaſon ſtrives after unity, or the connection of our knowledge, by claſſing all our ideas under a few heads which it ſuggeſts, and which are abſolute ſubſtance, abſolute cauſe, &c. Practical Reaſon ſtrives after unity or conſiſtency among our various deſires and their objects, by holding forth to our view principles and ideas which it likewiſe produces.

Reaſon,

Reaſon, therefore, as far as it has a power to determine our faculty of deſiring is, on that account, practical, becauſe it does thereby influence our practice. The faculty of being determined to action by reaſon is Will. Practical Reaſon, therefore, is the ſame with Will.

Our will is pure when it is determined by neceſſary and univerſal rules or laws; it is not pure when it is directed by feelings.

Remark. It has been thought, that our actions acquire a very great value from their being determined, or directed by ideas of objects, or ends determined by reaſon and the intellect. But it ought to be remembered, that whenever ideas of objects recommend themſelves to our deſires by any ſort of feelings, although they are formed or modified by reaſon or the intellect, yet our deſires, when influenced by them, are ſenſual, and not, on that account, moral. But of this more afterwards.

In our faculty of deſiring, we diſtinguiſh two things, which are matter and form. The matter is the object deſired, or, an idea of what is agreeable or diſagreeable; for, whenever an object, diſtinct from the mind, ſhall be deſired, it muſt excite

excite pleaſing ſenſations. The form is the mode of deſiring, and may either be rational or ſenſual.

Rational deſires are determined by ideas of rules. A rule is a poſition which teaches how any variety may be connected into a regular whole. A rule is theoretical, when it teaches how to connect a variety of knowledge; it is practical, when it regulates the variety of our deſires. A rule adapted to the will of a few individuals is a maxim; but when it is conformable to the reaſon of all rational beings, it is a law. Practical rules reduced to laws are practical principles.

All practical principles either originate in the matter of our deſires, that is, in the objects which affect us; or they derive from the form of our will and practical reaſon, that is, from the mode in which reaſon operates, and the ideas it produces, independent of ſenſible impulſe. The firſt may be denominated material, and the latter formal principles.

The mode in which reaſon operates, is known in the following ideas which it produces, by connecting the Categories. (See Principle xci, to ci.)

I. In

I. In the idea of abſolute totality; which, in a theoretical point of view, requires totality of knowledge; and in a practical, totality of caſes, to which a practical principle muſt be applicable; that is to ſay, the principles of our conduct muſt have the character of univerſality, or agree with the general will of all reaſonable beings, and be applicable to all circumſtances of life.

II. In the idea of unconditioned limitation which elevates our views above the limits of things in time, and manifeſtly teaches us to act independently of the quality of external objects, and the feelings which they produce. Reaſon acts uninfluenced by external objects, let us follow this mode of acting and be diſintereſted.

III. In the ideas of abſolute ſubſtance, cauſe, and concurrence, which loudly exhort us to be unalterable in our conduct, to be ſelf-active, and to harmonize in our actions with the actions of all rational beings.

According to reaſon, we muſt, therefore, act by principles that are univerſal and diſintereſted; to theſe principles we muſt adhere unalterably—we muſt realiſe them by ſelf-activity--not leave ourſelves

to be rouſed by pain or pleaſure, hope or fear, and thus endeavour to keep PACE with reaſonable beings.*

Reaſon either determines the will neceſſarily or not. In the firſt caſe the will is totally exempt from all ſenſible incentives, and therefore, holy; in the ſecond, it is determinable by the ſenſual and is unholy. The human will is determinable both by reaſon and ſenſe, but not neceſſarily by either.

A practical principle impoſed upon a will not neceſſarily determinable by reaſon, is an imperative, which ſort of principles announce themſelves in our conſciouſneſs by the term "ought," or "ſhould," and expreſs that relation which ſubſiſts between the univerſal laws of conduct and the weakneſs of the human will.

An imperative which is founded upon ſomething external to reaſon, for inſtance, upon an end to be obtained in the world, and which contains the means to that end, is merely hypothetical, and carries no obligation with it, unleſs it excites a deſire of the

* It might be objected that it is impoſſible for man to obey ſuch laws, but this will be conſidered in the end of the ſection.

end

end propoſed. An Imperative, on the other hand, which is founded upon reaſon itſelf, and which has no other end than that of realiſing the mode in which reaſon acts, is a Categorical Imperative which repreſents an action as neceſſary in itſelf, and impoſes an obligation upon all thoſe who would keep up their reaſon and not fall into contradiction with their own will.

Whatever determines our will is practically good, when it is grounded in laws that are obligatory to all reaſonable beings; but when any thing determines our will which is founded upon the ſubjective qualification of the individual, it is merely agreeable, though it may not be bad—to be practically good, it muſt be founded upon the general reaſon of mankind.

The dependance of our deſiring faculty upon feelings is inclination, and inclination ſuppoſes want. The dependance of this faculty upon reaſon, eſpecially becauſe it does not neceſſarily depend upon it, is intereſting.

Every intereſt is either empirical or rational. Empirical intereſt is mixt with feelings, and either is pathological or logical. The pathological in-

tereſt aims at the agreeable and pleaſing conſequences of an action; the logical aims at whatever might increaſe and improve our knowledge.

Intereſt purely rational is totally independent of whatever lies external to reaſon. Of this kind is the intereſt purely Moral, or Practical Intereſt, which we take in an action on account of its reaſonableneſs, and not on account of that object or thoſe ends and conſequences in which that action is concerned. That conſtitution of human nature which renders it poſſible that man can take an intereſt in laws that are ſtrictly diſintereſted and often inimical to the demands of ſenſual deſires, is the ſource of moral feeling.

All intereſt is practical, that is, incites man to action. It is a fact, that every rational man takes an intereſt in the moral deciſions of reaſon, it is, therefore, a fact that reaſon is practical, that is, may determine man to action. The moſt abandoned wretch, in the calm of ſerious reflection, when he has ſet before his eyes the example of a conduct, which is approved of by the univerſal voice of human reaſon, although he feels himſelf very much humbled by it, yet he cannot help wiſhing that his

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own conduct had been such as to deserve the same universal approbation.

As it is a fact, that reason is practical, it follows, that the human will is free.

Remark.—I beg the reader to remember, that I adduced page 173, the argument of the Necessitarians against the freedom of the human will. I observed, that this argument is impregnable, as long as we transfer the laws of cause and effect, which reside in the phenomena of time or space, or what is the same, in our own intuitions, to the things themselves, with which we are not acquainted. This observation very plainly shows, that the Necessitarians confound in their argument the laws by which our intuitions are arranged, with the laws by which the things themselves are arranged, of which we know nothing, and affords all the reasons necessary to prove that our notion of a free will is not contradictory nor imaginary; for if merely the form of our intuitions of things is time, it does not follow that the active substance called man, must therefore have the same form and be in time also; and as man is not in time, his will cannot be influenced by the laws of time, which are

those

thoſe of cauſe and effect; for theſe laws can be only where time is. By this reaſoning it has indeed been proved that the freedom of the human will may reaſonably and without contradiction be conceived. But the queſtion was, whether this reaſonable conception be alſo real, and whether there be any fact in man by which its reality can be proved. This fact I have promiſed to point out under the head of Morals, and ſhall do it immediately. Nor need I obſerve, that the matter to be proved is of great importance, for upon the proof of it all Morals muſt either ſtand or fall.—The argument is as follows :—

The Human Will is determined by PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES OF REASON, therefore it is FREE.

I ſhall firſt explain what is meant by Practical Principles of Reaſon.

I. A PRACTICAL PRINCIPLE of Reaſon neceſſarily excludes from its contents all objects of human volition that are diſtinct from reaſon. For if it recommends to the will any object external to the mind, it derives from the knowledge of an external object, that is, from experience. Any practical principle deriving from experience extends only

only ſo far as experience reaches, and is, therefore, not ſtrictly univerſal; nor is it ſtrictly neceſſary, becauſe our experience may indeed ſhow us that ſomething is ſo or ſo, but never that it muſt be ſo. But it is a fact well eſtabliſhed by conſciouſneſs, that a Practical Principle is ſtrictly neceſſary and univerſal. For inſtance, "*Be virtuous at all times, and under all circumſtances of life;*" and let thy virtue ever be diſintereſted. Although the notions of virtue and diſintereſtedneſs may differ in different perſons, yet it is undeniable that at leaſt the univerſality and neceſſity of theſe laws is acknowledged. Hence it follows, that a Practical Principle cannot derive from any knowledge of external objects, or experience; for elſe it could not be univerſal and neceſſary, which it manifeſtly is. Now in every Practical Principle we diſtinguiſh two things, matter and form. The matter is the object of the will; the form is the mode in which we will, or its reaſonableneſs, or, the mode how reaſon would connect the variety of human actions, which may be clearly ſeen in thoſe ideas that reaſon produces by connecting the variety of the pure intellect or the categories, and in thoſe Principles. (See Principles XC to CI.) which derive from

from the ideas produced by reaſon. Now as a Practical Principle excludes all matter, that is, all objects of the will, diſtinct from reaſon, which deſtroy univerſality and neceſſity, there remains for it nothing more than the form, or the mode in which reaſon acts when it forms ſuch a principle. The contents of a Practical Principle, therefore, exhibit no object diſtinct from reaſon or its produce, but the form of reaſon itſelf.

II. It is a fact that a formal practical principle can be repreſented and formed by reaſon only; that it cannot be an object of ſenſe, and that it, therefore, cannot reſide among the ſenſible phenomena. Conſequently the idea of a Practical Principle, conſidered as a ground which determines our will, muſt be different from thoſe grounds which determine the events in the world of phenomena; for every ground of determination in the world of phenomena is a phenomenon itſelf; the cauſe of a phenomenon in the world muſt ariſe and be a phenomenon; the effect of a phenomenon muſt be a phenomenon alſo.*

But

* The reader will pleaſe to guard himſelf againſt confounding the phenomena of things with the things themſelves, of which

But now the idea of a Practical Principle is not one of the phenomena in queſtion, it therefore cannot be the effect of a phenomenon; for otherwiſe it would be a phenomenon, which it is not; the idea of a practical principle is an idea of reaſon. But no idea of reaſon is an intuition; it therefore, is not a phenomenon; for intuitions only are phenomena, and it is only the intuitions which have the forms of time and ſpace, or are in time and ſpace, and not the ideas of reaſon. Hence the idea of a Practical Principle ſtands uninfluenced by the world of phenomena; but our will is determined by this idea; hence our will is determined by ſomething that lies beyond the reach of the cauſes and conditions of phenomena; it is, therefore independent of the natural law of the phenomena, which is that of cauſe and effect. But ſuch independence is freedom; hence our will is

which we know nothing. A phenomenon is an intuition and nothing more. Our intuitions are in time, becauſe the general form of all intuitions is time. Every intuition ariſes and vaniſhes; the intuition implying a cauſe ariſes and vaniſhes; the ſame is the caſe with the intuitions expreſſing effects. The ideas of reaſon are not intuitions; therefore they are not in time and not determined by the laws of time, and not phenomena. See Principle LXXXIX.

free. Every human will, therefore, as it is determined by Practical Principles, is free.

As the human will is free, the formal Practical Principles of Reaſon are the true laws of freedom, for it is by keeping to them only that man can elevate himſelf above the influence of the ſurrounding world, and follow the natural laws of his reaſon.

All formal Practical Principles of Reaſon are Moral Principles; for all Moral Principles muſt be practical, univerſal, and neceſſary, and if they are ſo, then they are nothing elſe than formal Practical Principles of Reaſon.

If a man would remain free, or become gradually more independent of external impulſe, he muſt ſtrictly keep to the moral law, and endeavour to grow in obedience towards it.

To obey any law ſuppoſes knowledge of it. How can man arrive at an accurate knowledge of the moral laws? It is anſwered, by paying due attention to the natural emotions of the heart and conſcience; but the emotions of the heart and conſcience change in proportion as knowledge encreaſes; they are different in different perſons, nor

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are they at all times the ſame in the ſame perſon. It is very well for a man to follow the influence of his heart and conſcience, while he knows of no other guides; but it is not ſufficient in a ſcience of morals, to conſult merely the heart and conſcience; for neither the one nor the other can be the ſource of univerſal principles, ſince both ſtand in need of direction, and if they are not educated by principle, will often lead the wrong way.

Man arrives at the knowledge of the Moral Law, or the law of his natural freedom, by the conſciouſneſs of the operations of his reaſon, although he is often a loſs to expreſs them by words, or does not clearly underſtand them. Let him only aſk himſelf when converſing with his friends and the world, Is my mode of acting ſuch as to be fit for an univerſal law of conduct among reaſonable beings? and he will find himſelf at no loſs for an anſwer. Suppoſe a man calumniates another, and conſiders this as excuſable, if he aſks himſelf: Can calumny become an univerſal law among reaſonable beings? he will directly perceive, that ſuch a law would deſtroy itſelf, if generally introduced; and that conſequently, in practiſing it he ſtands in contradic-

tion with his own reaſon, and muſt condemn himſelf. The ſame is the caſe with lying and the breaking of promiſes. Theſe practices may be defended by an appeal to unavoidable neceſſity, or to the general torrent of moral corruption, which carries every thing before it, but they cannot be excuſed. For, in all theſe caſes, man becomes immediately conſcious of the laws: Thou ſhalt not lie; Thou ſhalt not break thy promiſe. Theſe laws he cannot help acknowledging, and whatever contradicts them, he finds he muſt diſapprove. But theſe laws, which every man acknowledges, are purely formal; they exclude all objects of the will, and tell us, with a loud voice, that we ought to follow them whatever we may will, and that we ſhall not lie nor break a promiſe under any pretence whatever. Man, therefore, knows the formal practical principles by conſciouſneſs, although he cannot often explain what be the true ſource from which they flow, what be their exact number, and their preciſe ſpecific difference. Who can, however, ſtrictly execute ſuch rigorous laws? It is true, that no mortal will ever be able to execute them completely, becauſe they are ideal;

ideal; but man ſtands in need of ſuch practical ideals; his virtue is progreſſive, and not having any ſtandard of moral perfection, or any ideals of moral laws before his view, how could he know what progreſs in virtue he has made, or how could he make any progreſs at all?

It is, therefore, the firſt duty which a moral philoſopher owes to mankind, that he repreſent the moral laws in all their rigour and purity. If he accommodate them to the weakneſs of human nature, he miſtakes their end, perverts that ſtandard by which men ſhould meaſure the worth of their actions, and by miſleading them, commits a crime that can only be excuſed on the ground of guiltleſs ignorance.

To repreſent the moral laws in their purity, it is requiſite to know firſt wherein their common nature conſiſts. The common nature of moral laws, as mentioned already, conſiſts,

1. In their being formal laws, that is, in their not regarding any external object deſired, and in repreſenting the general form of reaſon alone as the pattern for imitation in our actions.
2. In their being univerſal.
3. In their being neceſſary.

A moral

A moral principle, expreſſing the common nature of all moral principles, is a firſt moral principle. And to know in what ſtate the ſcience of morals is, we need only compare the firſt principles of morals, as recommended to us by philoſophers. I have promiſed to make this compariſon in theſe pages, in order to ſhow the difference between Kant's ſyſtem of morals, and thoſe of other philoſophers. This promiſe I ſhall endeavour to fulfil immediately, and, to be as complete as poſſible, I ſhall begin with the firſt Moral Principle of Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Strive after the Contemplation of what is moſt beautiful.

The ideal of beauty is the offspring of ſenſe, the intellect, and reaſon. As this ideal does not expreſs the form of reaſon alone, the contemplation of it can conſtitute no pure moral principle.

PLATO.

Indulge thyſelf in the Contemplation of Speculative Truths.

As ſpeculative truths refer to more objects than the form of reaſon, thoſe laws which are built upon

upon them, will contain more than moral laws ſhould, that is, they will not be genuine moral laws.

EPICURUS.

Strive after a State totally free from Pain.

In order to get rid of pain, experience is requiſite; but experience can never be the ſource of Moral Laws.

ARISTIPPUS.

Strive after the greateſt Sum of Phyſical Enjoyments.

But this is ſtriving after ſomething which can be obtained by experience only. No object lying external to reaſon, can ſuggeſt any univerſal law.

ANTISTHENES.

Endeavour to be as free and independent, and to approach to the ſimplicity of nature, as nearly as poſſible.

Freedom and independance are the reſult of a morally good behaviour, and cannot, therefore, be the cauſe of it, or a moral law.

THE

THE STOICS.

Conſider the Welfare of the Whole as thy own Welfare.

To know the welfare of a whole of reaſonable beings we muſt know the general nature of reaſon; if we have acquired this knowledge, let us act accordingly, and not trouble ourſelves about the welfare of the whole; for this will follow of courſe, if every individual only endeavours to be reaſonable.

ARISTOTELES.

Strive after the higheſt Improvement of thy Mental Faculties.

This is a uſeful, but not a moral law. A moral law does not command us to attain a particular end, but it teaches us how we ought to conduct ourſelves in general, whatever be the end we may propoſe to reach. Beſides, any law recommending a particular end, is a particular law, and, therefore, wants an eſſential characteriſtic of a moral law, which is Univerſality.

POLE-

POLEMON.

Strive after the greateſt Sum of Corporeal as well as Mental Enjoyments.

Any law recommending enjoyments derives from experience, and ſo far from being a moral law, it is no law at all.

HOBBES.

Act agreeably to the Laws of thy Country.

This is a particular law. It confines man to the laws of a country only. But no government can provide laws for every particular caſe. The moral law is univerſal, and not particular. It commands us to be reaſonable and good, were we even among the Savages of North America, where there are no political laws.

MANDEVILLE.

Act conformably to the Conventions of Men.

This law is as particular as the former, and therefore not moral.

MONTAIGNE.

Act ſo as to gain the Favour of thoſe who are in Power.

This law recommends a particular end, and is therefore, not univerſal; it is not moral.

HUTCHESON.

Follow the Dictates of Moral Senſe.

The dictates of whatever comes under the appellation of ſenſe, can only be known by experience; but no ſort of experience can be the ſource of ſtrictly univerſal and neceſſary laws. Beſides, the feeling connected with the moral law, is conſequent upon practiſing and contemplating that law, and not antecedent to it. A man who places before his view an example of ſtrict and univerſal integrity or veracity, feels himſelf humbled by it; for he is conſcious that his conduct falls ſhort of this perfection. But this humiliating and remarkable feeling, which may be called regard for the moral law, is not antecedent but conſequent upon it. It

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is the effect of a law, and therefore cannot conſtitute the law itſelf, or be the ſource of the law.

SMITH.

Act ſo that the impartial Spectator can ſympathiſe with the Motives as well as the Tendency of thy Actions.

But this is appealing from the court of reaſon to another court, that muſt ſtand itſelf under the juriſdiction of reaſon. No man is ſtrictly impartial; he can only approach to this ideal. Why, therefore, ſhould we make the changeable, and often unjuſt, emotions of another man's ſympathy, the ſtandard of moral worth. Any principle, which holds out to our view the deciſions or conduct of particular men, as a ſtandard or pattern of imitation, is not univerſal, becauſe it can only derive from experience; it is not neceſſary, becauſe experience cannot teach neceſſity; it is not formal, becauſe it blends and confounds the unalterable form of reaſon with the changeable deciſions of man; it is, therefore, in no reſpect moral.

WOLF.

Strive after Perfection.

If this Principle were intended to exhort us to realize the decifions of reaſon, or its invariable form, it would not employ the vague term of Perfection, which already holds out an object different from reaſon itſelf. Beſides, to make one's ſelf perfect, ſuppoſes obedience to the moral law, which muſt neceſſarily guide our endeavours, if we would approach to perfection in virtue.

CRUSIUS.

Strive after the Favour and Approbation of the Deity.

No immoral being can obtain the favour of the Deity, if its immorality proceeds from inexcuſable guilt. A moral law, therefore, has nothing elſe to teach us, than how we muſt act, in order to become morally good. If it holds out an object of terror or happineſs, it bribes man into virtue, makes him an hypocrite, who pretends to love virtue, but in fact, loves only the profit he hopes to derive from it.

There

There are men who are ſo weak as not to have it in their power to conceive clearly the diſintereſtedneſs of the moral law, and, therefore, cannot reſolve to ſhew it in their actions. Upon theſe men we muſt have compaſſion, and not ridicule their principles, while they are not yet ſuſceptible of better inſtruction. We cannot all be equally wiſe, and he is the beſt, the worthy man, who endeavours to act according to his beſt knowledge, and to improve his knowledge. However, in a ſcience of philoſophic morals, we are bound to repreſent the laws of our natural freedom in their genuine purity, and reſcue them from all mixture of fear and pleaſure, which muſt neceſſarily impair that freedom, and ſpoil the purity of moral ſentiment.

THE ECLECTICS.

Encreaſe the Powers of the Mind and Body, bring them into the beſt poſſible Harmony, and let them all work towards one End.

The whole of this principle depends upon the end towards which the powers of man ſhall direct their operations. If this end be any thing diſtinct from

from the form of reaſon which we are to realiſe according to the moral law, then the whole principle, although uſeful in other reſpects, is very different from a genuine moral principle; if, on the other hand, that end is not diſtinct from the form of reaſon, it ought neceſſarily to have been couched in other terms.

KANT.

ACT ACCORDING TO THOSE PRINCIPLES ONLY OF WHICH THOU CANST WILL THAT THEY OUGHT TO BECOME THE GENERAL LAWS ON CONDUCT ANONG ALL REASONABLE BEINGS.

This Principle is firſt formal, for it recommends no other object than the mere form of reaſon; it is univerſal, becauſe it extends to all reaſonable beings; and it is neceſſary, becauſe the contrary of it cannot be even conceived, without deſtroying all thought of a moral law. An univerſal law of conduct is neceſſary; for a number of free actions, not directed by univerſal laws, muſt, neceſſarily contradict each other, and throw the whole into confuſion.

The reader will now find, that the difference between the firſt moral principle of KANT, and thoſe of

of other philoſophers, is, the former is built upon reaſon alone, the latter upon ſomething which is different from reaſon; the firſt is formal, univerſal, and neceſſary; the latter are material, particular, and not ſtrictly neceſſary; the firſt ſays, Let us, on all occaſions, be morally good, whatever may be the conſequence. The latter are not content with this; they propoſe ſome particular end, and force reaſon into the ſervitude of ſenſe; for whatever object or end diſtinct from reaſon be recommended, it can only be known by experience, and only be deſired as far as it excites pleaſing ſenſations or makes us happy. In ſuch a caſe we do not ſtrive to realiſe the general laws of reaſon; but to acquire pleaſing ſenſations, and reaſon muſt work as a ſervant to propoſe the beſt means of obtaining them; and, in being forced to do this, it is a ſlave, and not free; the conſequence of which is, that we become ſlaves alſo, and make ourſelves dependant upon things which change with the weather, and very often do not ſtand at our command.

It is perfectly right to ſtrive after pleaſing ſenſations or happineſs; for the deſire of happineſs,

is

is eſſential to human nature, and can only be deſtroyed with the deſtruction of human nature. But man diſcovers another deſire as eſſential to his nature as that of happineſs. He wants not only to be happy, but to be alſo a morally good man, that is to ſay, to keep up the natural freedom and independence of his will. Every man has, therefore, two great ends, in which all his exertions and deſires ultimately centre, and theſe are happineſs and independence, or virtue. Both ends taken together, form the great and complete object of all human deſires or the higheſt good, and every man muſt neceſſarily deſire both virtue and happineſs as long as he retains the nature of his mind and body. The higheſt good, therefore, conſiſts not in mere virtue, as the Stoics believed, nor in mere happineſs, as the Epicureans affirmed, but in the union of both. The higheſt good muſt be ſuppoſed by every man who will not fall into contradiction with himſelf, as practically poſſible, that is, as ſomething which it is poſſible to realiſe. For if it be not practically poſſible, our deſires of virtue and happineſs are directed towards ſomething which is impoſſible, or what is the ſame, they are altogether

ther abſurd. And this, I hope, none will ſuppoſe. If, therefore, it be granted, that the higheſt good is practically poſſible, thoſe conditions, under which alone it can be ſo, muſt likewiſe be granted. Now, it is clear, that when happineſs is made the road to virtue, all virtue is deſtroyed, and diſorder and confuſion is the immediate conſequence, which can neither be called happineſs nor the higheſt good; whereas if virtue be made the road to happineſs, happineſs will not be deſtroyed, but only confined to general laws which preſerve it againſt extravagance, and give it conſiſtency. Hence it follows, that the higheſt good is practically poſſible, only upon the condition that VIRTUE BE THE CAUSE OF HAPPINESS, and that man, before he ſtrives after any particular ſet of pleaſing ſenſations, ſhould always reflect, firſt, whether the moral law would permit him the enjoyment of them or not.

I might conclude here the moral part of my Treatiſe; for I believe I have already done what I have promiſed. I intended to give the reader a previous notion of Kant's Morals. This, I hope, I have, by explaining the common nature of his

Moral Principles, or his firſt Principles of Morals. Thoſe arguments which lead to it I have enumerated, as far as the limits of this Treatiſe permitted me. I have only to mention, therefore, that the work wherein all this is treated more at large, is the Criticiſm of Practical Reaſon, which conſiſts of about 292 pages, and which firſt proves that reaſon is practical, and that the will of man is free; ſecondly, that the complete number of moral laws may be, diſcovered, and how; thirdly, that it is the moral law alone which leads to a rational belief in a God, and the immortality of the ſoul; and, fourthly, that it is only a juſt enquiry into the bounds of human knowledge, which can ſecure theſe important notions, as well as the laws of morals againſt the comfortleſs attacks of Fataliſm, Scepticiſm, and Empiriciſm. And this important enquiry, Kant, as mentioned already, has very ſucceſsfully attempted in his Criticiſm of Pure Reaſon. I now proceed to ſtate that influence, which his Principles may have on our belief of the immortality of the ſoul, and the exiſtence of the Deity, which are the baſis of all religion.

INFLU-

INFLUENCE

OF

KANT's PRINCIPLES

ON

RELIGION.

Is the ſoul immortal? If not, religion has no end. Profeſſor Kant proves the immortality of the ſoul in the following manner:

A will determinable by the moral law can have no other object than the higheſt good, and all its exertions muſt ultimately centre in happineſs and virtue. As the higheſt good is not practically poſſible without virtue being made the cauſe of happineſs, (ſee page 217.) it follows that only complete virtue can produce complete happineſs, and thus render the higheſt good practically poſſible. Complete virtue, therefore, though not real, muſt yet be poſſible; for if it be not poſſible, the

higheſt good cannot be poſſible, which is abſurd. The will of man is not completely conformable to the laws of virtue, for it is not holy, nor CAN it be completely virtuous, becauſe virtue is an ideal which may be approached, but can never be reached by a finite being. But although the laws of morals cannot be completely fulfilled yet they muſt be acknowledged as neceſſary to be practiſed. Now, as we muſt follow the moral law, and can realiſe it only by approaches that are progreſſive *ad infinitum*, it is neceſſary for the ſake of our own practice to ſuppoſe ſuch a progreſs as practically poſſible. For if this progreſs is impoſſible, the moral law cannot be realiſed; if it cannot be realiſed, it is impoſſible; and to practiſe the moral law would, therefore, be to practiſe ſomething which is impoſſible. In the phyſical world we diſcover the ſtricteſt fitneſs; in the moral world this fitneſs would be deſtroyed, if we conceive that there could be any law that cannot be fulfilled, even by approaches that are progreſſive. What reaſon have we to ſuppoſe the latter? It might be aſked, What reaſon have *we* to ſuppoſe it? We ſuppoſe it to preſerve the uſe of our reaſon, which would be directly

rectly deſtroyed, if we take away the fitneſs from the moral world.

The caſe, therefore, ſtands thus: Thoſe who deny an infinite progreſs towards virtue, have no reaſon to do ſo, for they cannot defend themſelves by experience, nor by grounds *à priori*. Thoſe who hold the affirmative have ſufficient reaſons for doing ſo, becauſe it is only by affirming this that we can reaſonably reſolve to practiſe the moral law, and preſerve the uſe of our reaſon in a moral regard, which no man will relinquiſh upon ſlight grounds.

Now, as we are bound by reaſon to ſuppoſe our progreſs in virtue will be infinite, and as this progreſs cannot be made, unleſs the ſame perſon continues its exiſtence, it follows that the higheſt good is practically poſſible only on the condition of man's immortality.

Immortality being inſeparable from the higheſt good, and the only condition under which it is practically poſſible, it is, therefore, a poſtulate of practical reaſon, or a poſition which muſt be granted whenever we grant that the higheſt good is practically poſſible.

To

To know what kind of evidence this is, we muſt carefully examine what kind of evidences man has, and wherein their nature conſiſts.

We examine human evidence, when we conſider what it ſignifies: To be of opinion, to believe, to be certain, and to be demonſtratively certain.

1. The expreſſion. To be of opinion, means, to take ſomething for true, but from reaſons that are neither ſubjectively nor objectively ſufficient. This will be beſt illuſtrated thus: Suppoſe a man in India acquaints his friend in London that he lies dangerouſly ill. The perſon in London, when receiving this intelligence, may think that his friend abroad has died before the intelligence arrived; and in thinking this he is merely of opinion, that is, he takes ſomething for true, namely, the death of his friend, with the conſciouſneſs that he has neither ſufficient ſubjective nor ſufficient objective reaſons for the concluſion; not ſufficient ſubjective reaſons, becauſe the mere thinking a perſon dead, though it be not unreaſonable in the preſent caſe, is yet no argument that the perſon is really dead; and not ſufficient objective reaſons,

becauſe

becauſe the perſon ſuppoſed to be dead, is abroad and not under his inſpection; he cannot, therefore, examine him on the ſpot to know whether he be dead or alive.

II. To believe, is to take ſomething for true with the conſciouſneſs that there are ſufficient ſubjective reaſons for doing ſo, but no objective ones. For inſtance, we believe that Auguſtus was a Roman Emperor. To this we have no objective reaſons, for the object of this belief, the Emperor is no more, and we cannot draw from him any reaſons concerning his former exiſtence. But we have ſufficient ſubjective reaſon to take it for truth, that he really did exiſt; for all hiſtorians teſtify this, and the matter itſelf is neither unreaſonable nor inconceivable.

III. To be certain, is to take ſomething for true with the conſciouſneſs that both the ſubjective and objective reaſons are ſufficient. For inſtance, we are certain that ſuch a country as England exiſts; for we are in it, and have it before our eyes, and there is nothing in our ſubject or our thoughts which does not corroborate this truth.

IV. To

IV. To have demonſtrative certainty, is to have ſuch a certainty as makes us conſcious of the impoſſibility of the contrary. For inſtance, we are certain that every point in the circumference of a circle is at an equal diſtance from the centre; for we have ſufficient objective and ſubjective reaſons to this truth. But we have in this inſtance not only certainty, but alſo demonſtrative certainty; becauſe we are conſcious of the impoſſibility of the contrary; for if every point in the circumference of a circle were not at an equal diſtance from the centre, there would be no circle.

Is the proof brought forward by Kant in favour of the immortality of the ſoul, ſuch as to afford demonſtrative certainty? No; for it contains no objective reaſons, immortality being no object of which we can have knowledge, for to have knowledge of an object, the object muſt be repreſented by an intuition, that is, it muſt be in time and ſpace, and affect our ſenſes; but this cannot be the caſe with immortality. As the proof contains no objective reaſons, and thefore no certainty, it contains muchleſs demonſtrative certainty. But ought we not then to believe it? By all means; for we

have

have ſufficient ſubjective reaſons, although we have no objective ones. We muſt believe it, in order to be able to make any practical uſe of reaſon, which is by far more neceſſary and important than the theoretical.

The Kantean argument in favour of immortality, therefore, ſtands thus:

1. Immortality cannot be demonſtrated, becauſe it is no intuitive object.
2. The contrary of immortality cannot be demonſtrated, becauſe it would be demonſtrating ſomething of which man can have no intuition, that is, no knowledge *.
3. In favour of immortality we have ſufficient ſubjective reaſons, but not a ſhadow of ſubjective reaſon againſt it.

In this ſituation of things we muſt believe in immortality, or elſe lay aſide all uſe of reaſon at once. But although we muſt believe it, we cannot be certain of it, and this uncertainty is highly favourable to the cauſe of virtue; for were man quite

* In the Extract of Principles, I have ſhewn, that by our Reaſon, Intellect, and Senſitive Faculty, we can know only objects in time and ſpace, among which immortality cannot be reckoned.

certain that he is immortal he could not be virtuous, becauſe he would act from fear or hope, and thus degrade the purity of his moral motives, which conſiſts in ſtrict diſintereſtedneſs. I muſt repeat a remark which I have made above, that it is a great difference to write a ſcientific ſyſtem of morals, and to improve the uſual moral notions by ſermons. The firſt requires all the rigour of cold and impartial truth, and the ſecond a humane condeſcenſion to the habitual moral notions of our fellow creatures, whoſe ſituation in life does not always allow them to ſee truth as quickly as the philoſopher does. The great rule, "Act ſtrictly conformable to thy beſt knowledge, and endeavour to improve thy knowledge," muſt, in this particular, never be loſt out of ſight. It will preſerve amity among people of different opinions, and not retard the progreſs of truth.

I ſhall now adduce Kant's argument in favour of the exiſtence of the Deity.

The higheſt good, as already mentioned, is poſſible to be realiſed. It conſiſts of virtue and happineſs; and if it were not poſſible to be realiſed, it would be abſurd either to ſtrive after virtue

tue or happineſs; for, in ſuch a caſe we ſhould ſtrive after ſomething which is impoſſible.

As the chief part of the higheſt good, which is virtue, leads us into a belief of immortality, ſo the ſecond part of the higheſt good, which is happineſs, will lead us into a belief of the exiſtence of the Deity.

To be happy, it is requiſite that all proceed agreeably to our will and wiſhes; for we are unhappy in proportion as things take a turn contrary to our will and wiſhes. Happineſs, therefore, is founded upon the agreement of the ſurrounding nature with our will and deſires, with the end for which we exiſt, and with the eſſential grounds that determine our will. Let the determining grounds of our will be oppoſed by nature, and the diſcordance muſt either diminiſh or deſtroy our happineſs. As the moral law, which determines our will, is different from the determining grounds of the phenomena in nature; one being a law of freedom, and the others mechanical cauſes, it follows, that the moral law cannot contain the leaſt ground for ſuppoſing * a neceſſary connection between

* The Moral Law has been mentioned before to be the cauſe of happineſs, and now this ſeems to be contradicted. But the reader

virtue and a proportionate happineſs in a being belonging to the phenomena of nature, as a part, and which yet is directed in its actions by a law directly oppoſite to the mechanical courſe of nature. Man thus ſituated, in order to enjoy happineſs proportionate to his virtue, muſt either be the author of nature, or have the courſe of nature at his command; but being himſelf a part of nature, and, conſequently influenced by its laws, he has no power to regulate its courſe ſo as to procure himſelf a proportionate happineſs.

But although virtue be not attended with a proportionate happineſs in this world, yet the poſſibility of realiſing the higheſt good, neceſſarily depends upon a proportionate happineſs being the conſequence of virtue. For every rational and finite being neceſſarily deſires happineſs, that is, an agreement of the ſurrounding nature with the unalterable laws of his deſiring faculty. If it be impoſſible for nature ever to agree with our de-

reader will remember, that it has been added, we muſt *believe* that the Moral Law is the cauſe of happineſs, becauſe otherwiſe the higheſt good would not be practically poſſible, and not becauſe the Moral Law contains any ground to ſuppoſe that it really is ſo in this world.

ſires,

ſires, happineſs can never be realiſed; if happineſs can never be realiſed, the ſecond part of the higheſt good, which is happineſs, would be impoſſible. To ſtrive after happineſs, therefore, would be to ſtrive after ſomething which is impoſſible, that is, it would be abſurd, and the higheſt good, in ſuch a caſe, could only conſiſt in being virtuous. But the complete higheſt good of a finite and rational being, can never conſiſt only in being virtuous; every being of this deſcription has wants, deſires, feelings, and neceſſarily muſt deſire that the ſurrounding world ſhould agree with his wants, deſires, and feelings, and not oppoſe them. But the preſent world does not diſcover any exact agreement of this kind, nor has man the power to make it coincide with the neceſſary demands of his will.

If, therefore, virtue cannot procure a proportionate happineſs, it is abſurd to practiſe it. For the exiſtence of a man practiſing virtue is not improved by virtue; on the contrary, he is always expoſed by it to the ſevereſt ſacrifices, and that without attaining any regular end. If no man, in ſuch a caſe, could reaſonably propoſe to follow the

laws

laws of virtue, and if a proportionate happineſs be thus impoſſible to be produced by virtue, it follows, that the higheſt good is a mere chimera. Hence it is clear, that the higheſt good neceſſarily depends upon a proportionate happineſs being the conſequence of virtue, and muſt either ſtand or fall upon this foundation.

However, to keep up the uſe of our reaſon, and to preſerve our natural freedom, we muſt neceſſarily ſtrive after virtue, and as virtue, reaſon, and natural freedom were without an end, if they did not tend to improve our exiſtence and to make us proportionately happy, it unavoidably follows, that in order to remain reaſonable, we muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe a proportionate happineſs to be conſequent upon virtue.

But he that allows this connection between the parts of the higheſt good, muſt neceſſarily allow that condition under which this connection is, poſſible. This condition of poſſibility can lie no where elſe than in a cauſe diſtinct from nature, in a cauſe which produced nature, and has the power to realiſe the agreement of nature with our moral conduct. Hence the higheſt good is poſſible

ſible only by ſuppoſing a cauſe different from nature, a firſt cauſe of all nature. But to proportion happineſs to virtue, requires a will and underſtanding. Hence the firſt cauſe, in order to realiſe the higheſt good, muſt have a will and underderſtanding, *it muſt be a Deity.* And thus it follows, that the higheſt good is not poſſible to be realiſed, unleſs there exiſts a God.

There remains, conſequently, the following alternative only. Either we muſt allow, that the higheſt good can be realiſed, and then we muſt neceſſarily grant that condition under which alone it can be realiſed, that is, the exiſtence of a Deity. Or we muſt deny that the higheſt good can be realiſed, and then we muſt give up, if we can, all deſire of happineſs and virtue as chimerical, and conſider both as impoſſible to be realiſed; which, I conceive, no man will do, who would not have his name ſtruck out from the liſt of reaſonable beings.

What ſort of evidence is that, therefore, which Kant offers in favour of the exiſtence of the Deity? It is no demonſtration; it is not certainty; but it is belief, a belief founded upon the moral nature of man,

man, and as impoſſible to be ſhaken as it is impoſſible to deny the authority of the moral law.

The influence which Kant's Philoſophy in general, and particularly his arguments concerning the Deity and the immortality of the ſoul, may have on religion, is that it ſecures theſe two important objects againſt all manner of demonſtrations, which have done more miſchief in the moral world than even Fataliſm. There is no demonſtration poſſible, either for or againſt the exiſtence of any of theſe important objects. For we have no intuition of them, and if we have no intuition we can demonſtrate nothing. Beſides, if Kant's Principles are well underſtood, we ſhall not ſay, that we are as certain of the exiſtence of the Deity and immortality, as we are of our own exiſtence. We have no ſuch certainty on this head; for of both objects we have no knowledge, but only notions; but from mere notions of things we can derive no certainty that the things really exiſt. Moreover, by thus deſtroying improper arguments, which never fail to produce Scepticiſm, room is made for a rational belief, which, although it be not the higheſt

higheſt degree of conviction, yet is perfectly ſufficient to make us ſtrive after virtue, and to leave us an opportunity of becoming virtuous from diſintereſted motives. For even to believe in a Deity ſuppoſes a regard for the moral law, and it is only he that will not relinquiſh that law, that can ſincerely believe in a God. The phyſical world can of itſelf give no information of a God; it is a collection of cauſes and effects, where every cauſe has another cauſe in *infinitum*. And though we are led by it to a firſt cauſe, yet it is the moral nature of man alone, which teaches us that the firſt cauſe is a moral being, that is, a God.

As the exiſtence of the Deity and the immortality of the ſoul form the grand ſource of all religion, and as I have already explained Kant's opinions upon theſe ſubjects, I hope, I have done as much as the end of this work required of me, and may now leave my reader to judge himſelf, whether Kant's Philoſophy deſerves to be ſtudied and examined or not.

As this Treatiſe concentrates a number of Theoretical and Practical Principles, which are ſcat-

tered over the extent of five volumes, and as it places before the reader, the moſt important reſults of the Kantean Philoſophy, together with the Principles from which they ariſe, I hope it will not be conſidered as a work of no uſe, however deficient it might be with regard to ſtile and execution.

THE END.